No paradox of contemporary politics is filled with a more
poignant irony than the discrepancy between the efforts of well-meaning
idealists who stubbornly insist on regarding as "inalienable" those
human rights, which are enjoyed only by citizens of the most prosperous and
civilized countries, and the situation of the rightless themselves. Their
situation has deteriorated just as stubbornly, until the internment camp—prior
to the second World War the exception rather than the rule for the stateless—has
become the routine solution for the problem of domicile of the "displaced
persons."
Even the terminology applied to the stateless has
deteriorated. The term "stateless" at least acknowledged the fact
that these persons had lost the protection of their government and required
international agreements for safeguarding their legal status. The post-war term
"displaced persons" was invented during the war for the express
purpose of liquidating statelessness once and for all by ignoring its
existence. Nonrecognition of statelessness always means repatriation, i.e.,
deportation to a country of origin, which either refuses to recognize the
prospective repatriate as a citizen, or, on the contrary, urgently wants him
back for punishment. (H.Arendt, OT, p.279)
With enviable and characteristic perspicacity, in this
striking passage from her magnum opus, The Origins of Totalitarianism,
Hannah Arendt encapsulates the main categories and the leading themes that
surround the theory of the modern State and simultaneously identifies the
frightening faultline that traverses the political reality of the State and
threatens its very existence and that of its polity.
The “well-meaning idealists” who clamour for the
“inalienable human rights” make the appallingly astounding mistake of assuming
or perhaps pretending that there exist in life “human rights” that are
“inalienable”. In its crude and starry-eyed stupidity, this belief amounts to
the pretence that somewhere in the firmament of stars or in the blue vault of
the sky there exist real and indestructible objects called “human rights” that
no human force can “alienate” or remove, negate and even obliterate from the
reality of human existence! Utter and contemptible folly! Where is it written?
In what shoal of land or on what sea shore, in what deepest cave or highest
mountain can I find such a “thing”, such a tangible reality as not just “human
rights”, but also human rights that are – “inalienable”! Show me or
anyone where such a reality or object actually exists – or even simply why
and it should actually exist and how it could exist! (This
is Schopenhauer’s contemptuous yet irresistible chastisement of Kant’s
categorical imperative and even of Voltaire’s “enlightened” credulity or
Leibniz’s Panglossian fantasies.) This utopian humanistic fantasy is enshrined,
of course, in the American Constitution – “We hold these truths to be
self-evident…”, but if they are “self-evident”, why then “hold” them to
be so? – and reprised in typical Gallic grandiloquence in the French Universal
Declaration of the Rights of Man.
In hard stone-cold reality the only “rights” that
exist are those legal rights that can be enforced by a political entity called
the State by means of the twin weapons of legal monopoly over the use of
violence in a given delimited national territory and through the legitimate
assertion of its authority over the citizenry or polity of humans living within
those national boundaries or domain.
This, then, must be the task and end-goal of all realistic
political action: - the erection of a State that can impose on its subjects or
citizenry, its constituency or polity, the observance of legal
rights that arise from the political will of that polity! The tragedy of all
“displaced people” or “refugees” (economic or political) is not that their
“human rights” have been denied or trampled upon – because no such abstract
lunacy exists in reality -, but rather that they suffer the indignity of “state-lessness”.
Not the presence or absence of chimeric “human rights”, then, but rather the protection
of human beings by a “State” able, willing and ready to protect whatever legal
rights it is able to enforce within or even without its domain or territory
bounded by national borders – this is the crucial question that must be tackled
by all of us who are concerned about the fate of human freedom and welfare. The
problem is not that refugees or displaced people have their human rights denied
– because these do not exist; the problem, the tragedy is that there
exist human beings on Earth who are “state-less”. The crucial problem
here, the crux of the biscuit, as it were, is the State – and to the
theory of the State we must turn now.
We begin by drawing a crucial distinction between a State
and a Nation. A State is the political institution or apparatus
that administers the essential functions of a Nation. It follows that a State
can have varying degrees of control over a Nation through the exercise of
violence, power and authority – depending on its increasing levels of legitimacy
over the Nation. By contrast, a Nation has varying degrees of cohesion and
solidarity that affect the legitimacy and sometimes even the legality of
the State. It may happen therefore that a State rules over a broken nation and
that a nation is ruled over by a failed state. It is obvious then that the
expression nation-state con-fuses by conflating them the distinct
concepts of state and nation.
Our cardinal contention here is that Western liberalism
has weakened democratic states in favour of dictatorial states principally by seeking
to dissolve the political concept and the reality of nationality and its
related pursuit of patriotism.
Even in its highest, most sophisticated expression,
liberalism pointed to its own dissolution. It was Benjamin Constant who best
summarized the historical process whereby the State had been transformed from
Antiquity to Modernity. To be sure, Constant fails to identify the specific
role of the social production of wealth – from slave labour to serfdom
(feudalism) through to wage labour (capitalism). Nonetheless, he catches
admirably the key “political” difference between the ancient polity and the
modern nation-state. The reason that he fails to identify the crucial
difference between the capitalist mode of production and that of Antiquity is, of
course, that from within his liberalist theoretical perspective,
the economy is scientifically separate from the Political – and therefore the
Political transformation of the State can be traced independently of the
process of production.
Yet there is one aspect of economic activity – that of
“commerce” – that Constant isolates as the crucial catalyst in this
transformation. According to him, what has made possible the transfer of
political power from the associated citizen to the liberal State is the rise of
commercial activity whereby individual citizens have been
induced to focus on their own private gain rather than on the standing of their
nation against other nations and on the daily conduct of public administration.
Because commerce has made possible the overcoming of
war over scarce resources through the exchange of goods, individuals within nations
have preferred to pursue commercial activities rather than support their
nation-states in wars aimed at wresting control over wealth from other nations
by military means. Because of this, all individuals within nation-states have
an interest in preserving social and international peace and indeed they have
as great an interest in ensuring that their nation-state does not interfere
with their private property as they have in ensuring that other nation-states
do not confront their own State. Thus, commerce works in two ways – internationally,
by ensuring that commerce replaces war as a means of obtaining and maximizing
individual wealth, and nationally by limiting the power and
function of the State to preserving private property. It turns out therefore
that it is the market economy that ensures both the national liberties of
individual citizens and international peace.
But commerce also has one essential function: by
turning the energies of individual citizens inward toward the maximization of
their personal wealth, it also favours the transfer of the exercise of
political freedom from the direct involvement of individual citizens to “elected
representatives” who are entrusted with running the machinery of State and, in
turn, appropriate the political power and energy of citizens in exchange for
the granting of maximum “liberties” to each citizen.
Thus, first of all, commerce replaces exchange with
war, both nationally between individuals, and internationally between
nation-states. Second, because of its emphasis on exchange and wealth
maximization, commerce involves “calculation” and therefore it encourages
citizens to require a rational State and also to delegate their freedom to the
State through representatives because commerce and its calculation require much
more complex social relations and services that individual citizens cannot
oversee directly – hence the need for “bureaucracy” (cf. Weber’s cognate theory
of the State as the product of capitalist Kalkulation and Rationalisierung in Parlament
und Regierung).
Two developments, then, have conspired to remove
democratic control by citizens over the State since Antiquity: the first is the
rise of commerce which has reduced the power of nation-states in military
conflict whilst at the same time it has turned citizens “inward” toward
protecting their individual “private property” and to entrust the “elected
representatives” and the State bureaucracy with the power to administer society
and protect their “rights”. The second is the sheer size of nation-states
which, unlike the ancient republics from Athens to Rome to Geneva, no longer
lend themselves to individual citizen involvement in day-to-day politics.
Thus, from “active freedom” in the sense of
participatory democracy, modern-day citizens have moved to minimizing their
engagement in Politics but at the same time maximizing their “passive
liberties” that the State is called to guarantee.
But what happens if the State fails to maintain
such guarantees over the liberties of
individual citizens? Two problems immediately arise in Constant’s theory of the
liberal State. And these are problems that show conclusively why liberalism and
democracy, far from being synonyms or even cognate terms, are in fact
contradictory concepts, and why therefore “liberal democracy” is an oxymoron.
The first problem that the liberal State, far from being neutral, is in fact
bound to act to protect the private property of individuals – and therefore its
social role is functional to the protection of the “rights” of wealthy
citizens. As George Orwell might have put it, all citizens are equal under the
law; but some are “more equal” than others – depending on their property
holdings.
The second and related problem is that, depending on
the “type” of property held by individual citizens, some citizens might find it
easier to escape the control of the State – or, obversely, they may have more control
over the State – simply by virtue of the fact that these citizens may hold the
State to ransom as against other States! This danger is particularly acute and
virulent in capitalist societies because the widespread existence of money and
markets makes wealth particularly “liquid” and “mobile”. Here is Constant
acknowledging in his own ideological liberalist terms the tremendous importance
of this point!
Le commerce rend l'action de
l'arbitraire sur notre existence plus vexatoire qu'autrefois, parce que nos
spéculations étant plus variées, l'arbitraire doit se multiplier pour les
atteindre; mais le commerce rend aussi l'action de l'arbitraire plus facile a
éluder, parce qu'il change la nature de la propriété, qui devient par ce changement
presque insaisissable. Le commerce donne à la propriété une qualité nouvelle,
la circulation: sans circulation, la propriété n'est qu'un usufruit; l'autorité
peut toujours influer sur l'usufruit, car elle peut enlever la jouissance; mais
la circulation met un obstacle invisible et invincible à cette action du
pouvoir social. Les effets du commerce s'étendent encore plus loin: non
seulement il affranchit les individus, mais, en créant le crédit, il rend
l'autorité dépendante.
L'argent, dit un auteur français, est
l'arme la plus dangereuse du despotisme, mais il est en même temps son frein le
plus puissant; le crédit est soumis à l'opinion; la force est inutile; l'argent
se cache ou s'enfuit; toutes les opérations de l'État sont suspendues. Le crédit
n'avait pas la même influence chez les anciens; leurs gouvernements étaient
plus forts que les particuliers; les particuliers sont plus forts que les
pouvoirs politiques de nos jours; la richesse est une puissance plus disponible
dans tous les instants, plus applicable a tous les intérêts, et par conséquent
bien plus réelle et mieux obéie; le pouvoir
15
menace, la richesse récompense: on
échappe au pouvoir en le trompant; pour obtenir les faveurs de la richesse, il
faut la servir: celle-ci doit l'emporter.
Par une suite des mêmes causes,
l'existence individuelle est moins englobée dans l'existence politique. Les
individus transplantent au loin leurs trésors; ils portent avec eux toutes les
jouissances de la vie privée; le commerce a rapproché les nations, et leur a
donné des moeurs et des habitudes à peu près pareilles: les chefs peuvent être
ennemis; les peuples sont compatriotes.
In other words, as Constant’s wily analysis makes
plain, it is the very spread of capitalist industry and therefore also of
finance – it is the “world market” of capitalism that allows capitalists to
play off, to establish a competitive tension, between different
nation-states for investments so as to subtract themselves from any sort of
“political” control, regardless of whether this control is democratic
or not!
So in his own words, Constant is saying that the
capitalist world market allows capitalists to elude the checks and balances
that nation-states can impose on them by establishing a coalition of capitalist
interests that run counter to the interests of the individual nation-states!
[L]e commerce a rapproché les nations, et leur a donné
des moeurs et des habitudes à peu près pareilles: les chefs peuvent
être ennemis; les peuples sont compatriotes.
The utterly and devastatingly anti-democratic bearing
of Constant’s liberalist position could not be any more frightfully evident!
The kind of “freedom” or “liberties” that Constant champions are to be
subjected not to the “neutral” political control of the nation-state but rather
to the control of capitalists by means of the nation-state! It is not the
democratic nation-state that controls private property; instead, it is private
property that controls the nation-state in accordance with “liberal” principles:
liberalism and democracy could not be more starkly opposed! This is the true
and devastatingly terrifying implications of Constant’s liberalism, and
therefore the theoretical endpoint of all liberalist political theory. Here is
Constant again:
Que le pouvoir s'y résigne donc; il nous
faut de la liberté, et nous l'aurons; mais comme la liberté qu'il nous faut est
différente de celle des anciens, il faut à cette liberté une autre organisation
que celle qui pourrait convenir a la liberté antique; dans celle-ci, plus
l'homme consacrait de temps et de force a l'exercice de ses droits politiques,
plus il se croyait libre; dans l'espèce de liberté dont nous sommes
susceptibles, plus l'exercice de nos droits politiques nous laissera de temps
pour nos intérêts privés, plus la liberté nous sera précieuse.
De la vient, Messieurs, la nécessité du
système représentatif. Le système représentatif n'est autre chose qu'une
organisation à l'aide de laquelle une nation se décharge sur quelques individus
de ce qu'elle ne peut ou ne veut pas faire elle-même. Les individus pauvres
font euxmêmes leurs affaires: les hommes riches prennent des intendants. C'est
l'histoire des nations anciennes et des nations modernes. Le système
représentatif est une procuration donnée à un certain nombre d'hommes par la
masse du peuple, qui veut que ses intérêts soient défendus, et qui néanmoins
n'a pas le temps de les défendre toujours lui-même. Mais a moins d'être
insensés, les hommes riches qui ont des intendants examinent avec attention et
sévérité si ces intendants font leur devoir, s'ils ne sont ni négligents ni
corruptibles, ni incapables; et pour juger de la gestion de ces mandataires,
les commettants qui ont de la prudence se mettent bien au fait des affaires
dont ils leur confient l'administration. De même, les peuples qui, dans le but
de jouir de la liberté qui leur convient, recourent au système représentatif,
doivent exercer une surveillance active et constante sur leur représentants, et
se réserver, à des époques qui ne soient pas séparées par de trop longs
intervalles, le droit de les écarter s'ils ont trompé leurs voeux, et de
révoquer les pouvoirs dont ils auraient abusé.
Notice how in the quotation above, Constant constantly and
surreptitiously shifts from “les hommes riches” to “les
masses” and “les peuples” as if these entities were
one and the same thing! In reality, of course, the interests of the wealthy
(capitalists in a capitalist economy) and those of “the masses” (mainly wage
labourers in capitalism) hardly ever coincide – and certainly they cannot coincide
where the democratic operation of Constant’s “representative government” is
concerned: because such a government will obviously represent the interests
of “les hommes riches” (capitalists) well before it protects
those of “les masses”! And the interests of capitalists and workers
cannot coincide for the very reason that Constant himself reveals – that “les
individus pauvres” (workers) are too busy “working” for a living to be
able to oversee and monitor the work of their “representatives”! As we have
argued again and again here, the essence of capitalism is the violent
enforcement of the wage relation whereby capitalists force workers to give up
their political freedom as living labour “in exchange for”
the product of their living labour – what we call “dead
labour” or “wages” which are the monetary equivalent of dead labour.
We have argued
repeatedly here that liberalism and democracy are conceptually contradictory
and, therefore, they have been shown historically time and time again to
be incompatible. A liberal regime aims exclusively to preserve,
protect and enhance individual property rights: as such, therefore, it is
incorrect to identify it with “individualism”, except perhaps as a contrast to
“collectivism”, because in championing the rights of individuals who own
property, liberalism quite obviously will crush the rights of individuals
who do not own property or who own less property.
Evidently, the paramount protection of property rights and therefore the free
exchange of claims to property - which, together, form the essence of liberal
doctrine and practice -, is entirely inconsistent with the exercise of
political freedom and decision-making by all members of society in a manner
that is not tainted by the ownership of property.
Two of the biggest fallacies
in Benjamin Constant’s oblique championing of liberalism are, first, his
assertion that the ability of property owners to remove their property from a
nation-state is an exercise of democracy; and second that, by removing their
property to other nation-states, property owners actively discipline their
nation-state and establish “competitive tension” between nation-states to
foster democratic principles and institutions worldwide. This is perhaps the
biggest non sequitur in Constant’s entire otherwise most
valuable oeuvre: - because quite clearly, as the history of western liberalism
and capitalism reveals, the bourgeoisie removes property from a nation-state
and places it in another nation-state not at all to promote
democratic rights, but rather to ensure that private property rights are
protected! There is a vital difference between the protection of property
rights and democracy that Constant clearly missed! On the contrary, history
reveals that the bourgeoisie is indeed quite willing to move capital to
authoritarian and even dictatorial regimes so long as it can reasonably expect
that such regimes will protect and enhance its property rights! Even under
Hitler, under no less than the Nazi dictatorship, the German bourgeoisie was
entirely happy to keep its property under the protection of that most brutal
regime.
Thus, far from
enhancing democracy, the free movement of capital has more often than not
enhanced dictatorship. Perhaps the most colossal example of this in capitalist
history is the huge transfer of capitalist investment to the Chinese
dictatorship from 1980 until our present day! And this occurred in large part
not because the bourgeoisie could be sure of the protection of its rights –
though that was reasonable given the ability of the Chinese dictatorship to
enforce them against its own people -, but rather because the Communist Chinese
dictatorship was willing to subject its population of over a billion people to
the exploitation on the part of the Western capitalist bourgeoisie and, in the
process, to turn itself into a powerful capitalist bourgeoisie in its own
right!
As we have argued
repeatedly here, it was Carl Schmitt who perhaps most systematically and
coherently demolished the rationale and ideology of liberalism, precisely by evincing
the theoretical-historical inconsistency of democratic parliamentary
institutions and the institutions of private property. Of course, Schmitt’s aim
was manifestly anti-democratic; yet this does not diminish the potency of the
arguments he advanced against Western bourgeois parliamentary regimes. The
false identification of liberalism with democracy is the reason why every
critique of liberalism is immediately denounced by the bourgeoisie as an
assault on “democracy” – by which it means “liberalism”.
In the present day,
aside from the Western bourgeois transfer of resources to the control of the
Chinese dictatorship without first exacting peremptory guarantees for the
democratic representation of its oppressed workers and wider population,
perhaps the worst example of how liberal principles can demolish democratic
institutions is the championing of liberal economic principles and practices by
the German bourgeoisie – what is widely known as Ordo-liberalism -, a practice
that is rapidly leading to the unravelling of the European Union and its
lurching into authoritarian, if not openly dictatorial, waters. So strident and
harmful has this practice been, that even the most prominent commentators of
bourgeois publications have inveighed against it, to no avail.
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