Logos, Logic, Life-World
The eschatology of the Judaeo-Christian
Logos has a spatio-temporal trajectory from physis to telos that
is all internal to the logic of the Logos itself, to its dialectic,
to its ability to order the life-world in a rational manner by simply naming
it. (Of course, Hegel’s Absolute Idealism is the highest expression of this
logos of the Spirit as the unfolding of the Idea in space and in time.) The
Word – the concept, thought, the idea, and hence the mind and the soul, the
embodiment of the Spirit – is what establishes the ordo et connexio rerum et
idearum, the adaequatio rei et intellectus – or rather, the adaequatio
rei ad intellectus, the conformity of the material and mundane world to
the spiritual and the intellectual! It is not “the thing” that does the
rational ordering; it is the Word, the intellect with its logic. This World
belongs to the Flesh: it is the World of beguiling shadows (Plato), of sin and
falsehood (Augustine), of diabolical deception (Descartes), of mere appearances
(Kant), of painful mortality and dreadful transience (Schopenhauer,
Kierkegaard) – a world that only the guiding light of the Word as incarnate
Spirit, as Logos, can illuminate and ultimately save and lead to eternal
life.
Once again, in the dialectic of the Logos, it is the Word with
its logic or reason that is truly perfectly real. The reality and truth of the
Logos lie entirely within the a priori deductive logic of the Word,
independent of experience. The divine purity and perfection of the Soul
ensconce, insulate and cleanse it from the fallible inductive empiricism of the
Body. The Cartesian cogito
immortalizes the “methodical doubt” with regard to “the thing”, the Object
opposed to the Subject. (The German word for “object”, Gegen-stand
[standing-against, same as Latin ob-ponere], emphasizes this op-position
of Subject to Object.) With Descartes, the scientific method becomes a
“methodical doubt” that exposes “the thing” – perceived, external reality – as
entirely deceptive and unreliable. The only certainty is the introspective and
reflexive experience of thought and its logic. Only the deductive
reasoning of the intellect through logic and mathematics can yield the Truth.
The physical world is irremediably and irredeemably separated antinomically
from the intellect because the human perception of it can yield only partial,
evanescent empirico-inductive verities. This world, the external
world of space and time, the world of the human senses, is false! For this
reason, both the Word-as-Spirit as well as the Logos - the Word-as-Flesh - are
not of this World!
Two separate realities for Descartes,
then; two heterogeneous “things” – the res cogitans (the Mind or
Intellect) and the res extensa (Nature or Matter). The Word-as-Spirit
can have no con-nection, no nexus with the physical world because
it is categorically different and distinct from it. Only the Word-as-Logos, the
Word-made-Flesh, could devise a logical order - an ordo et connexio rerum et idearum,
an adaequatio rei et intellectus - for the world if and only if the Word
were conceived not as the transcendent Word-as-Spirit, but rather, to
repeat, as the immanent Word-as-Flesh, as the Logos. For Descartes, this
novel immanent understanding of the Logos as Word-as-Flesh is simply and wholly
impossible because he, like all rationalist philosophers from Plato onwards,
can conceive of Truth only as logico-mathematical certainty – indeed, we
argue, as tautological syllogism where the conclusion follows from the
premises! Because of this “dogmatism” (Hegel) with regard to Truth-as-Identity
(A=A), Descartes insisted (quite logically on his own premises) on the
irreconcilability of the res cogitans (the Mind or Intellect) and the res
extensa (the physical world). The difficulty with the notion of logic and
mathematics as the perfection of the Mind or Intellect, as its pure divine and
spiritual “truth”, is that if logic is to be anything more than empty,
desultory tautology, its categories or rules – what makes a statement or
proposition or calculus “logical” or “illogical” – must be able to hold,
to contain a content. In other words, it is quite impossible to think of
a logical category, concept or rule that does not hold a material
content, that does not refer to a “thing”. The word itself, con-cept
(from the Latin, cepere, to grab, to hold), implies that a concept must
“hold” an object. The logic of thought cannot be severed from the logic of
things – because “things” are already the objects of thought and subject to its
“logic”!
Of course, material things understood as
mere objects, as Kantian “things-in-themselves”, could never be taken as the
“contents” or objects of logical concepts and rules because, by definition, “things”
in themselves – by the mere fact of being objects in themselves and
therefore inaccessible to the intellect, mere qualitates occultae –
could not re-present the content of any concept whatsoever. Yet, logical
categories or concepts or rules must have a material content in the sense that
not only must they refer to a particular sensible “thing”, but also
they themselves – concepts themselves! – constitute a material sensible content
– that they themselves are their own content! Thought is always and
everywhere and simultaneously also reflection, thought about
thought. It is a huge fallacy to think that there can be a “pure concept”, a
concept that is pure form (eidos) lacking any content! As Kant himself
put it, “concepts without content are empty, and content without concept
is blind”. Evident here is the Kantian desperate search – “groping in
the dark” - for a sensuous grounding of thought away from his formal categorical
Schematismus! Despite this valuable insight, the fallacy that Kant
committed was to separate form and content, schemata and
sense-perceptions, concept and conceived, thought and its object, in any case!
There is no “concept” as such that is distinct or even distinguishable – that
is conceivable! – except as content, and vice versa. Hence, the
logic of thought is also indistinguishable from the logic of things –
not because there are “things-in-themselves”, objects that have this qualitas
occulta, but rather for the precise reason that all “things” or “objects”
are already “objects of thought”, “contents of concepts”!
This was, it
will be recalled, the basis of Schopenhauer’s fierce critique of Kant. The
complex relation of logic as “logic of thought” and “logic of things” is deftly
elaborated in Heidegger’s Heraclitus. (We shall develop this thesis more
amply below in connection with Kant’s idealism.) Significantly, Descartes’s
best effort at unifying the deductive sciences (theology, metaphysics and
mathematics) and the inductive sciences (physics, optics, biology) – a
distinction going back to Aristotle and universally accepted in mediaeval
thought - could be articulated only by means of an organic metaphor
– the arbor scientiarum (the tree of science) whereby the former disciplines
were the “roots” and “trunk” out of which the latter “branches” could grow. The
difficulty, once again, as should be amply obvious, is that no metaphor can
establish a logical or epistemo-logical nexus between logico-mathematics as
understood by Descartes, on one side, and the physical sciences that he enlists
as “outgrowths” or “branches” of the “pure sciences”, that is to say, logic and
mathematics. (See P. Rossi, The Birth of Science in Europe. Also, A.
Negri, Descartes, The Reasonable Ideology.) The idea of a “logic as
science of the pure concept” theorized by Benedetto Croce (cf. his Logica
come scienza del concetto puro) is simply a fantastic chimaera – a
mythological hybrid beast – because there cannot be any “science” (understood
in our sense of “scientific practices or techniques”) that deals with “pure
concepts”. Indeed, there can be no such thing as a “pure concept” because all
concepts, as objects of thought, have a material ec-sistence – as
“thoughts”, as human activities.
Not
surprisingly, the Cartesian apotheosis of logical-deductive reasoning as the
only valid methodology for the acquisition of scientific knowledge (episteme),
and the consequent degradation of empirical-inductive research (techne’
and doxa), sealed the separation of intellectual and manual
labor for late-mediaeval European thought. On the other hand, Cartesian dualism
and the consequent “dogmatic” application
of the “methodical doubt” to human
perception and scientific induction mark perhaps the true beginning of modern European
skepticism and nihilism, both of which, paradoxical as it may seem, may
have opened the way to the development of European science. (On modern European
skepticism, see R. Popkin, The History of Skepticism in Europe. On all
this, cf. my “Descartes’s World”.) Doubtless, it was the rampant nihilism of
the chorismos of the Judaeo-Christian Logos that aroused Nietzsche’s
fury in Twilight of the Idols and The Genealogy of Morals and,
not least, in Beyond Good and Evil. The author of Zarathustra
could not stomach the rationalist view that this world, the only world
we know and in which we live, is false! His famous genial riposte (in the Second
Untimely Meditation) to Descartes’s cogito, ergo sum (I think,
therefore I am) was its inverse, vivo, ergo cogito (I live, therefore I
think).
Of course,
there are a host of calamitous consequences generated by the rationalist Weltanschauung:
apart from the nihilism or annihilation of the natural terrestrial
world in favour of the celestial one, together with the dogmatic
prescription of a strict religious morality – which were the primary targets of
Nietzsche’s ire aimed at Christianity -, there is also the hypostatization of
the division between intellectual and manual labour and,
sociologically, of the “oratorial” classes of clergy and monks, on one hand,
and menial workers, artisans and peasants, on the other. These, together with
the military order, formed the famous “three orders” into which mediaeval
society has been categorized (see G. Duby, The Three Orders and The
Age of the Cathedrals). (The word nihilism itself was first used by
R. Jacobi in a letter in reference to Fichte’s “empirical Idealism”, the most
extreme exasperation of German Classical Idealism as a reaction to Kant whereby
the Subject, the I, simply produces itself as the non-I or “empirical I”, as
“the world” until it attains the Absolute or Absolute Knowledge. As Jacobi well
perceived, such a philosophy stultifyingly represents the annihilation of the
material world itself!)
As we
have seen, taken separately in their original acceptation, Spirit and
Flesh, are antinomic concepts because the spirituality of the one
categorically excludes the materiality of the other. The antinomy of the
concepts of Word-as-Spirit and Flesh-as-Nature wholly escapes the valiant pneumatology
of St. John in the Gospels. Yet, his rendering of the Christian Logos
serves, so to speak, as a conceptual bridge to overcome this antinomy, to
bridge this gap (Greek, choris) between the immortal or eternal (God,
Spirit, Soul, Mind, Subject) and the mortal or perishable (World, Nature, Body,
Matter, Object). Only with Kant’s Critical Idealism will we have a precise formulation
of the insurmountability of these antinomies. But because this gap simply
cannot be filled rationally – because the eternal and the perishable,
the mortal and the immortal quite simply negate the possibility of their
opposites, then it follows that just like the Word-as-Spirit, as Absolute, the
Logos itself, or the Word as the presumed incarnation of the Spirit, the
Word-as-Flesh, must remain problematic – an enigma that is
impenetrable even to metaphysical thought and insolubly tied to the sphere of
religious faith (pistis). Just like the Divinity, therefore – just like the Absolute
Spirit (Hegel) – the Logos, the Word-as-Flesh, can be conceptualized only as a mysterium
fidei (a mystery of faith).
Nevertheless, there is a way out of this impasse, a way to overcome this
arcanum and its related chorismos by simply reflecting a little
more deeply on the formulation of the concepts of Word and Flesh. Indeed, as
defined, Word and Flesh are irresolubly antinomic concepts. But the separation
or chorismos of Word and Flesh and of Being and Space-Time is untenably aporetic because
the two notions inter-penetrate each other: the Word is inconceivable
without the materiality that the Flesh entails;
and the Flesh would not be conceivable either without
the conceptuality of the Word. The Flesh grounds the Word,
and the Word conceptualizes the Flesh. Deprived of its materiality, the
Word would turn into vapid immaterial Spirit opposed to Nature, and the Logos
would lose its historical meaning and redemptive mission in the world.
Similarly, divested of its conceptual content, the Flesh would hold no meaning
whatsoever because no meaning could be assigned or attributed to
it. Indeed, it may be said that the notion of Word contains already that
of Flesh in the sense that physical material existence – the flesh – is already
implied totally in the very notion of Word. At the same time, the meaning of
Word contains that of action given that “word” is derived from the Latin verbum,
whence “verb” comes to denote all “actions” in our speech. Tellingly, the
French noun for “word” is mot, which again like the Latin verbum
points to motion or action. And motion, as Aristotle showed, is the
central concept in all metaphysical speculation concerning Being in its dual
aspect as actuality (movement, change or becoming) and potentiality
(rest, substance, permanence). Both the Word and the Logos are aspects of
Being, either actually or potentially. Deprived of Space-Time,
Being would cease to have any content and meaning. An eternal, time-less
Being would simply be devoid of meaning because it could not ec-sist,
it could not be real, it would be a non-being, indeed a non-sense! Equally,
a ubiquitous in-finite Being would lack all meaning because it would
have no spatial finitude or boundary: it would not be an entity
(in Leibniz’s famous saying, “a being is a [one distinct]
being”). (These aspects of the Logos, of finitude and unity, we shall examine
in connection with Heidegger’s critique of Scholastic and Kantian metaphysics.)
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