We insisted earlier on the periodization of
totalitarian dictatorship, specifically as it applies either to advanced
industrial capitalist societies or to societies
that - like Russia and China – may have degenerated into totalitarianism
by transplanting the ideals of Western revolutionary movements of the Right and
of the Left without a fully stratified class structure such as the West had
developed. In the latter case, of course, the embryonic and undeveloped
industrial proletariat was in open revolt against quasi-feudal social
structures that had not developed a large middle class of “petty bourgeois” and
was forced consequently to seek an alliance with large disenfranchised and
impoverished peasantries.
There is a resemblance between the rise of fascism
and the rise of communism: both are made possible by the existence of a
relatively small, tightly-knit, and well-disciplined organization and both
depend for their success on the widespread support of large masses of people
who flock to the movement suddenly during a period of acute crisis. The
differences are, however, more striking, especially for a student of social
stratification. In the countries of advanced industrialization we have a large
middle class which initially resists the revolutionary attempts from the Right
and the Left, only to join the fascist movement when it is about to attain
power. In the predominantly agrarian countries, where the communist movement
has been successful so far, no such middle class exists; hence success must
necessarily depend upon the support of other social groups, especially the
peasants.21 (R. Bendix, “Social Stratification and Political Power”.)
The periodization - from embryonic revolutionary
movement to party structure, to seizure of parliamentary power, to erection of
a parallel Party-State, to dictatorship, and finally to totalitarian
dictatorship – is rendered necessary by the transformation that occurs
invariably in the nature of revolutionary mass movements from before
their seizure of political power to after such seizure has occurred. It
is the frequently profound difference between the two moments of the evolution
of these movements that has led to the false debate over the validity or less
of an independent concept of totalitarianism in the study of dictatorial
regimes. The chief objection of those who oppose such a separate concept for
historical analysis is that the term “totalitarian” does not apply to every
stage of a dictatorship.
This is undoubtedly right, and it is a feature that
we are emphasizing here; but this is not to say that the totalitarian stage is
not one that is separable as a distinct political and historical category of
analysis. Given our own theorization of the concept, it is evident that we
oppose the extension of the category of totalitarianism to the early or
embryonic phase of revolutionary movements. For instance, in our analysis it
would be absurd or oxymoronic to speak of “totalitarian movements” – because by
the time a “movement” has become “totalitarian” it is a Party-State, not a
“movement” any longer! The usefulness of this separate treatment of
totalitarianism is that, for instance, it allows what is an undoubtedly
fruitful comparison of fascism and bolshevism or Hitlerism and Stalinism in
terms of “the organization of the totalitarian state” (cf. Alberto Aquarone’s
great work on the Italian fascist state by that title.) Mosse is quite entitled
to insist on the inapplicability of the concept to the early histories of the
fascist or bolshevist movements – precisely because, as we are arguing, these
movements originate from very different historical sources and also because
they undergo essential changes as they progress toward the formation of a
totalitarian state.
Here is how Mosse tackles the similarities and
differences between fascism and bolshevism and then reaches a conclusion
consistent with our own approach:
Both
movements were based on the ideal, however distorted, of popular sovereignty.
This meant the rejection of parliamentary government and representative
institutions on behalf of a democracy of the masses in which the people would
in theory directly govern themselves. The leader symbolized the people; he
expressed the “general will”—but such a democracy meant that, instead of
representative assemblies, a new secular religion mediated between people and
leaders, providing, at the same time, an instrument of social control over the
masses. It was expressed on the public level through official ceremonies,
festivals, and not least, the use of political imagery, and on a private level
through control over all aspects of life by the dictates of the single
political party. This system was common in various degrees to fascist and
bolshevist movements. The danger inherent in subsuming both systems under the
concept of totalitarianism is that it may serve to disguise real differences,
not only between bolshevism and fascism but also between the different forms of
fascism themselves. Moreover, the contention that these theories really compare
fascism not with the early, more experimental years of bolshevism, but with
Stalinism instead seems justified. Indeed, totalitarianism as a static
concept often veils the development of both fascism and bolshevism. In
Soviet Russia, for example, the kind of public ceremonies and festivals that
mark the fascist political style were tried early in the régime but then
dropped, and not
Toward a
General Theory of Fascism / 3
resumed
until after the Second World War, when they came to fulfill the same functions
as they had for fascism earlier. In 1966, Pravda wrote that rallies, ceremonial processions,
speeches, and music gave emotional strength to the political commitment of the
people.2 Fascism, too, did not remain static, although even some critics of
totalitarian theory apparently see it as unchanging. There is, for
example, a difference between fascism as a political movement and as a
government in power. (G L Mosse, The Fascist Revolution, pp.2-3)
But this is precisely the distinction we are making
and which we submit justifies the categorical distinction between revolutionary
movement, dictatorship, and totalitarian dictatorship, that is to say,
the fact and reality that (a) “totalitarianism as a static concept often
veils the development of both fascism and bolshevism”; and (b) that “there
is… a difference between fascism as a political movement and as a government in
power”! Here Mosse has practically conceded what we have maintained all
along! Whereas the fascist and bolshevist movements – as embryonic revolutionary
forces – are indeed very difficult to compare (as Bendix emphasized in the
quotation above), once these movements proceed to the stage of totalitarian
dictatorships the similarities quite simply overwhelm the differences, as we
shall seek to demonstrate shortly. So much so, that these similarities become
too great a source of political insights for us to fail to pursue them as
historical and political analysts and, above all else, as social agents
interested in the fate of our own societies.
Here is instead how Bendix makes a mistake with the
opposite valence to Mosse’s. For, whilst agreeing with us that what we call “revolutionary
movements” must be treated separately at different moments of their evolution,
Bendix makes the grave error to speak of “totalitarian movements”, a
phrase to which we object on the ground stated above that by the time a
revolutionary movement evolves into a totalitarian state or dictatorship, it
simply ceases to be a “movement” because it has become a Party-State, however
much party-states may wish to maintain the propagandistic myth of remaining
a dynamic “movement”, as against a
static State, aiming at achieving an overriding ideal goal. Here is Bendix,
then:
Propositions concerning the conquest of power by a totalitarian
movement have suffered repeatedly from a failure to distinguish the several
elements of a successful totalitarian movement. One important distinction
should be made between the description of a movement before its conquest of
power and afterwards. (Bendix, loc.cit.)
Now, it ought to be utterly obvious that a
“movement” that has still not achieved “its conquest of power” cannot by that
very fact (!) be called a “totalitarian movement” for the simple reason that it
has yet not attained the political power required for the exercise of
totalitarian rule over its polity! Nevertheless, Bendix’s study is invaluable
because it makes the distinction between revolutionary movements “before” and
“after” their seizure of power, and because it proceeds to suggest also two
other vital distinctions that elude most analysts:
A second distinction should emphasize the difference
between the nucleus of leaders, their immediate entourage (subleaders), the
party members, and the supporting or acquiescent masses. And a third
distinction probably should refer to the reasons for the increasing weakness
of established institutions rather than to the reasons for the strength
of the totalitarian threat. Any analysis of a totalitarian movement should
leave no doubt as to which aspect of the problem it is concerned with. (Bendix,
loc.cit.)
Hence, the first distinction concerns the evolution
of revolutionary movements from before to after the acquisition of political
power. The second distinction refers to the essential transformation of the
political leadership in terms of function and direction and personnel that is
universally observable in the unfolding of these movements from embryonic to
totalitarian status. And third there is a distinction to be made - one of
paramount importance - about the “increasing weakness” of existing state
and political institutions with respect to allowing the the revolutionary party
to seize political power, and then to proceed virtually unchallenged to erect
parallel state structures and mechanisms aimed at countering and eventually replacing
those existing institutions!
There are then a number of lessons to be drawn from
our critical review of the literature around totalitarian dictatorships. The
first lesson is that it is quite incorrect and counterproductive to object to
the formulation of a separate political category to describe totalitarianism: -
incorrect, for the overwhelming reason that once party-state dictatorships
proceed to the totalitarian stage they overcome their earlier ideological
differences and in effect adopt political and even economic strategies and
structures that are extremely similar if not indistinguishable; and
counterproductive or misleading because failure to distinguish the various
moments in the evolution of revolutionary movements leads their analysis to
invert the order of importance of the factors that determine that evolution.
This last point is an intricate one and deserves separate and careful
treatment.
As Mosse pointed out in the earlier quotation, even
studies critical of the separate treatment of totalitarianism treat fascism as
a homogeneous and unchanging entity, when in fact there are decisive
metamorphoses that occur in its political itinerary from movement to
totalitarian party-state. We agree with Mosse, therefore, that the distinct
moments of revolutionary movements need to be kept firmly in mind and that any
theory of totalitarianism that seeks to smooth or erase these distinct
qualitative moments must be rejected just as firmly. Where Mosse and nearly all
other critics of totalitarianism go wrong, however, is firstly in considering
that all theories of totalitarianism make this mistake – which is demonstrably
false. Secondly, these critics of totalitarian theory invariably erase the
differences that they say are important between the various stages of
revolutionary movements by inverting the order of importance or significance of
the social drivers of these movements.
Indeed, nearly all critics of totalitarian theory
insist on the role of cultural factors – nationalism, racism, massification,
religious liturgy, cultural and social regimentation, leadership cult,
propaganda and terror – as being primary or wholly dominant at every stage of
the evolution of revolutionary movements. What we are seeking to establish
here, instead, is that this is entirely incorrect and misleading because in
historical reality the overwhelming weight of evidence is that it is the
economic factors and their concomitant or consequential social dislocation –
“the social question” – that are unquestionably preponderant in
determining the origin and formation of revolutionary movements. This is indeed
in line with the Marxist or materialist historical theory that gives priority
to the economic base (the reproduction of society) over the ideological
superstructure in the aetiology of social and historical events. What happens
at the totalitarian stage, however, is that the ideological superstructure
overtakes and virtually suppresses the economic rationality of the societies
and territories ruled by totalitarian dictatorships. These are historical
realities so similar, so demonstrable, and so repetitive as to be almost
predictable and inconfutable!
The vice of the “cultural history” approaches to
revolutionary movements and fascism in particular is that it wrongfully
understates the importance of socio-economic factors in their origin and
jejunely exaggerates the role of cultural factors, to the point that they fail
to discern what are the indispensable and sociologically predictable
preconditions for their emergence and the drivers of their evolution. By
focussing excessively on “fascist self-understanding and
self-representation”, cultural history runs the risk of becoming an
“anything goes” Hegelian night “in which all cows are black”! But then, - and
here is the clincher – unable to deny the convergence of these movements in
their totalitarian stage, cultural history is desultorily compelled to conclude
and concede that, mutatis mutanda, “fascist movements had their differences
but they shared a common approach to politics”! Here is Mosse to confirm
our thesis:
Fascism always appropriated already existing,
familiar and popular ideas while manipulating them and integrating them into
its own world view. Fascism was a new political movement but not a movement
which invented anything new; it annexed the long familiar and made it a
part of its racism and nationalism. That was some of its real strength: it
offered regeneration with security and revolution with the already familiar.
These themes which grow out of the attempt which cultural history provides to
comprehend fascist self-understanding and self-representation will be
pursued in the chapters which follow. Fascist movements had their
differences but they shared a common approach to politics. (Mosse, The
Fascist Revolution, p.xvii.)
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