tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7359664066632610820.post2883738849588941529..comments2024-03-13T09:37:45.372-07:00Comments on The Economics Forum 21: Merleau-Ponty and the Phenomenology of PerceptionJoseph Belbrunohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10859665074758447033noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7359664066632610820.post-38879020478184082522017-08-31T21:17:40.588-07:002017-08-31T21:17:40.588-07:00I’ve been mulling over this concept of the “ontoge...I’ve been mulling over this concept of the “ontogeny of thought.” From what I gather, the term originates in Human, All Too Human (the translation I found online uses “genesis” and “development” rather than ontogeny) and refers to the development of instincts into consciousness and logic and science. In paragraph 18 of the section “Of First and Last Things,” the development takes place historically between species. Nietzsche refers to lower organisms that don’t exhibit these higher ways of thought. They only appear in humans, who have developed afterwards. Thought also develops individually: “We are hungry, but originally we do not know that the organism must be nourished: on the contrary that feeling seems to manifest itself without reason or purpose; it stands out by itself and seems quite independent.”<br /><br />I notice similarities with Heidegger’s concepts of zuhanden and vorhanden. At first, these seem to refer to different modes or attitudes of being that come to the fore at different times—the act of using a hammer can be pointed to as an example of zuhanden. They also occur at the same time—or at least the being of zuhanden is always present with vorhanden. We are always engaged in situated activity even when we are contemplating a being as it is in itself. But Heidegger also seems to be interested in temporalizing the relationship, with zuhanden being primordial to vorhanden. <br /><br />Where I start to get confused is how this temporal relationship for both Heidegger and Nietzsche is supposed to refer to events that happen “at once” and why they think temporality is necessary for defining this relationship. Is temporality necessary because if the relationship wasn’t temporal, then zuhanden would have to be conceived as some sort of inscrutable reality that stands behind vorhanden in the manner of traditional metaphysics? Does having vorhanden “develop” out of zuhanden avoid this problem? And must they happen at once because we cannot conceive of vorhanden occurring by itself in its own time *after* zuhanded has occurred?<br /><br />And then my other question concerns how the Nazi concentration camps operated on the basis of the ontogeny of thought. I understand that Nietzsche viewed the instincts as exploitative, but is that integral to the ontogeny of thought or is that a separate part of his philosophy? I can perhaps see how exploitation might be seen as integral to ontogeny or development insofar as development is a process of differentiation and such differentiation is interpreted as violence committed by the organism against its environment (including other organisms). But the presentation in Heidegger seems much more innocuous, and I would like to believe we could maintain an emphasis on "life before thought" without the politics of the concentration camp. (Of course I realize that Heidegger actually was a Nazi, which makes me wonder where violence might be hidden within his thought. Perhaps in Dasein’s struggle for authenticity against the “they-self”?) Does developing a “phylogeny of thought” consist merely in recognizing the human species as an organism—applying an ontogenetic analysis to an area where Nietzsche refuses to apply it? Or does a phylogenetic approach require a more radical break from ontogeny? Dannoreply@blogger.com