In this sense, affluence and wretchedness are only
two sides of the same coin; the bonds of necessity need not be of iron, they
can be made of silk. Freedom and luxury
have always been thought to be incompatible, and the modern estimate that
tends to blame the insistence of the Founding Fathers on frugality and
'simplicity of manners' (Jefferson) upon a Puritan contempt for the delights of
the world much rather testifies to an inability to understand freedom than to a
freedom from prejudice. (H.
Arendt, On Revolution, ch.3, p.193)
62.
OnRevolution
[I]t is beyond doubt [62] that the young Marx
became convinced that the reason why the French Revolution had failed to found
freedom was that it had failed to solve the social question. From this he concluded
that freedom and poverty were
incompatible. His most explosive and indeed most original contribution to
the cause of revolution was that he interpreted the compelling needs of mass
poverty in political terms as an uprising, not for the sake of bread or wealth,
but for the sake of freedom as well. What he learned from the French Revolution
was that poverty can be a political force of the first order. (ch.2, pp.61-2)
The
subject-matter of the Economics – its subjectum, its substratum, its nervus
rerum – is the “system of needs and wants”, it is the sphere of “necessity”, of
“pro-duction” that “gravitates” ultimately around “reproduction”. Whether
“labor” is seen as the source of “value” or whether value is seen as arising
from the “saving” of “labor”, the fundamental reality remains that “labor” is
at the heart of “the social question”. That “freedom and poverty” may be
incompatible is a problem or “social question” that may be resolved simply by
eliminating poverty: but if “freedom and luxury” also are incompatible, as
Arendt suggests, then humanity has an even greater problem – and freedom has found
an insurmountable barrier!
What Arendt means
here, if one subtracts the silly wordiness, is that “the pursuit of luxury” or
“private happiness”, may tend to shrink the social, “public” space or universe
of human beings so as to render them a-political – with the consequent neglect
of the forms of political activity
that “freedom” must stand for, in opposition to “passive” liberties. To be “free” is for Arendt to engage actively in the
political life of one’s community. To be “at liberty” to do something, instead,
is to be the passive beneficiary of a right or benefit “conceded” to oneself by
the powers that be. In this sense, one may say that “freedom” and “the pursuit
of luxury” may well be at odds, but not be necessarily “incompatible”!
With Classics and
Neoclassics, the sphere of “happiness” or “utility” is always “private” because
“labor” can be “divided” so the whole point of the “sociality” of social labor
is lost. The private sphere is what must be protected from the State – the
escape from the state of nature and its necessity. “Freedom” is confused with
“liberty”. There is no notion of “public happiness” because “happiness” or
“utility” or “pleasure” is limited to the oikos – the household (Alberti in Della Famiglia, to Franklin ).
Arendt rebukes
Weber (implicitly) because the latter assumes that the “frugality” of the
Founding Fathers was purely Puritanical – when in fact it could have been the
“opposite” of retreat from the world, of “renunciation”: it could have been due
to a greater concern for “public happiness” and therefore “freedom” than for
“private happiness” and therefore “luxury”. This again would contrast with
Weber’s interpretation of the spirit of capitalism. Here the “citizen” would
prevail over the “bourgeois”. We note that in Weber this “antithesis” does not
even begin to exist.
At the same time,
Arendt is chastising Marx for equating “freedom from poverty” with “freedom”
itself. So the mere fact that people are de-livered from poverty and lifted
into luxury does not mean that “freedom” will be instored. Here Arendt is
divorcing “wealth” or “value” – economic action – from political institutions:
- which is something that neither Marx nor Weber seem able to do because they
tie “the most basic needs”, including that for “freedom”, to “the care for
material or external goods”, and thereby “reduce” the notion of “freedom” to
that of a “material or external good”.
This helps
explain why in Weber there is concern for parliamentary democracy only to the
extent that it is “functional” to “the rational organisation of labor” and
ultimately to “the iron cage”. Both the ascetic ideal and the iron cage are
“irrational”. Weber sees the “freedom” of “labor” only as “autonomous market
demand” and not in broader “political” terms. This is Arendt’s reproach to
Weber. But she forgets, as Marx would pointedly remind her, that her own
high-brow conception of “freedom” does not deal integrally, let alone fairly,
with what is the most important aspect of human existence under capitalism: -
wage labor, which Weber confuses with human living labor.
There can be
precious little “freedom” if one is under the yoke of “the rational
organisation of ‘free’ labor under the regular discipline of the factory”, as
Weber defines “capitalism”. Arendt succeeds only in demonstrating her “poverty
of philosophy” by mistaking Marx with Proudhon, the bathetic author of “The
Philosophy of Poverty”! That poverty and freedom are two different concepts is
blatantly evident. But that Marx ever made the mistake of confusing deliverance
from poverty with freedom when in fact he was stating merely that “freedom”
offers very little solace to those who are poor, is an accusation unworthy of
Arendt’s otherwise admirable intellect.
The crucial
difference between Marx and Proudhon is that Marx did not waste time “philosophising”
about poverty, preferring instead to find out the social “causes” behind its
indisputable existence in capitalism. And the difference between Marx and Weber
is that, having found out that capitalism reduces “living labor” to “labor
power” – that is, in Weber’s own words, to “the rational organisation of
(formally) ‘free’ labor under the regular discipline of the factory” -, Marx
could see that the social power of the bourgeoisie consists precisely in this
violent “reduction” of human living labor to mere “labor power”. Weber’s phrase
“free labor” is not an oxymoron because his “labor” is an entity that can be
either “free” or “not free” because he wrongly identifies all human activity
with “labor power”. For Marx, instead, it is impossible for “living labor” to
be anything but “free”: it is only under the violent command of the capitalist
that living labor is turned into “labor power”.
The problem is
then to understand what relationship there is between “freedom” and “labor” in
Weber’s work. If Weber is concerned about “profit” or “capitalistic economic
action”, it is because it is this that “provides” rationally for those “freely
expressed” wants and needs of workers that can be provided for most efficiently
by “the rational organisation of labor (meaning, “labor power”) under the
regular (capitalist) discipline of the factory”.
There is a sense
in which the Neoclassical notion of “equilibrium” has to do with the
“necessity” of “scarcity” of “provisions” in proportion to endless “wants”.
Both Schopenhauer and Robbins understand the Will and “wants”, respectively, as
“insatiable”. But whereas Schopenhauer sees this as a motive “to renounce” the
world of wants, Robbins takes it more realistically as the “budget constraint”
of Neoclassical Theory as “the science of choice” – what makes “choice” subject
to “scientific and rational” treatment.
But in order to
escape from the “gravitational orbit” of “equilibrium” the “freedom” of the
entrepreneur is needed. Indeed, the entire point to Neoclassical value theory
is precisely the ability of the capitalist-entrepreneur “to free” himself from
“immediate consumption” by “deferring” it and thereby “substituting” it with
“labor-saving tools”. It is not the “renunciation” of Schopenhauer whose
society is entirely “eristic” and the State can only keep individuals from
descending back into the bellum civium. For Neoclassical theory the State can
reward the productivity of labor by protecting the “deferral of consumption” of
the capitalist entrepreneur.
For Schumpeter
this “deferral” is not sufficient because it belongs to the “Statik”: value and
profits can arise only from the “creativity” of the entrepreneur who “elevates”
and therefore “frees” himself from the gravitational pull of the “static” and
reaches the heights of “innovation” by distinguishing his
“individuality-personality” (Unternehmer-personalitat) from that of the “mass”.
The State must therefore do more than just protect property rights: it must
also protect intellectual property from the “rentier” capitalists (finance). Not
“labor” but “enterprise” is the gateway to “freedom” and “profit” as against
“interest” and “rent”.
With Classical
theory, instead, the capitalist appears “redundant” from the start, because
“labor” is the source of value. Even Marx’s version preserves this “socially
necessary labor time” and the “reproduction of society”. – Whence comes the
“surplus value” that capitalists exploit from workers.
But Marx
introduces the “use value” of living labor. - So here the sphere of “necessity”
is labor-power and that of potential “freedom” is “living labor” (Grundrisse).
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