Commentary on Political Economy

Tuesday 28 November 2023

IMPORTANT PIECE FROM RAMPINI. PLEASE USE GOOGLE TRANSLATE TO READ

 

C’è un’America che dà ragione al Papa: «C’è un Nuovo Asse, la Terza guerra mondiale è cominciata» | Federico Rampini

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28 novembre 2023

Due analisi pubblicate sulla National Review, organo autorevole del pensiero conservatore, individuano un Nuovo Asse formato da Cina, Russia e Iran: «Hanno divergenze, ma anche Hitler, Mussolini e Hirohito li avevano»

E se avesse ragionepapa Francesco? In vari discorsi il pontefice ha parlato di una Terza guerra mondiale, come se fosse già cominciata. Forse tra l’Ucraina e il Medio Oriente siamo già scivolati dentro un terzo conflitto mondiale.

I moniti del papa trovano una risonanza in un mondo che gli è intellettualmente distante, la destra americana della realpolitik, abituata ad analizzare la geopolitica alla luce dei rapporti di forze tra le grandi potenze. Due analisi apparse nell’ultimo numero della National Review, un organo autorevole del pensiero conservatore (non trumpiano, anzi generalmente anti-trumpiano), sembrano allinearsi con la visione del mondo evocata dal papa argentino.

Il «Nuovo Asse» e il parallelo con la Seconda guerra mondiale

Nella loro analisi il mondo è sottoposto all’offensiva di un nuovo Asse, analogo a quello che unì la Germania nazista, l’Italia fascista, e il Giappone militarista nella seconda guerra mondiale. La prima analisi con questo taglio è di Mike Watson, uno dei dirigenti dello Hudson Institute. Nel saggio intitolato «The Fragility of Civilization», Watson osserva: «Si può obiettare che l’attacco della Russia contro l’Ucraina l’attacco per procura dell’Iran contro Israele(usando Hamas, ndr) non sono collegati fra loro. È vero. Le nuove potenze alleate dell’Asse non si fidano l’una dell’altra, proprio come le vecchie potenze dell’Asse, e non sembrano condividere pienamente le rispettive strategie l’una con l’altra. Ma una persona adagiata nell’autocompiacimento nel 1936 avrebbe avuto egualmente ragione a sottolineare che l’invasione giapponese della Manciuria, quella italiana in Etiopia, e la guerra per procura combattuta dalla Germania in Spagna, non erano i prodotti di un unico grande disegno. Alla fine però quelle tre potenze si unirono per conquistare gran parte dell’Europa e dell’Asia».

Che cosa è in grado di fare l’Iran: «Conseguenze immense»

A questa analogia Watson aggiunge un’analisi sulla portata in gioco dell’attacco contro Israele: «Molte delle componenti più critiche e dinamiche dell’economia globale sono altrettanto vulnerabili quanto lo è Israele. L’Iran lo ha dimostrato quando ha colpito la raffineria petrolifera Abqaiq in Arabia saudita nel 2019: è capace di devastare i mercati energetici mondiali usando solo pochi missili e droni; e ha la volontà per farlo. Se la crisi di Gaza si allarga in un vasto conflitto regionale, le conseguenze potrebbero essere immense: l’Iran ha più di 3.000 missili ballistici ed ha armato Hezbollah con più di 100.000 razzi. Razzi e artiglieria potrebbero chiudere il Canale di Suez, un quinto del petrolio e del gas mondiale potrebbe rimanere bloccato nel Golfo, negato alle fabbriche e alle case di Europa e Asia. La capacità d’innovazione d’Israele, che ha migliorato le vite di milioni di persone nel mondo intero, sarebbe dirottata in una lotta per la sopravvivenza. Il costo umano si estenderebbe ben oltre il Medio Oriente».

L’importanza del controllo delle coste

L’immagine del Nuovo Asse, parallelo a quello fra Berlino Tokyo e Roma nella seconda guerra mondiale, ritorna sulla National Review in un altro saggio, firmato da Seth Cropsey: ex alto ufficiale della U.S. Navy ed ex sottosegretario alla Marina militare, è il fondatore dello Yorkstown Institute. Cropsey aggiorna le analisi classiche del pensiero geopolitico sui conflitti per il dominio dello «Eurasian rimland», cioè la cornice o fascia costiera della massa continentale eurasiatica. L’importanza di controllare le zone marittime e costiere dell’Europa, del Medio Oriente e dell’Asia, fu teorizzata negli anni Trenta del Novecento dallo studioso americano Nicholas John Spykman. Le sue visioni ispirarono la strategia di «contenimento» adottata dagli Stati Uniti nei confronti dell’Unione sovietica. Oggi secondo Cropsey due aree cruciali del «rimland eurasiatico» sono già in piena guerra, Ucraina e Israele. «Russia, Cina, Iran – scrive – hanno forgiato un’intesa che assomiglia all’Asse di metà Novecento. Queste nuove potenze revisioniste (nel senso che vogliono “rivedere” l’ordine internazionale, scardinarlo per sostituirlo con un assetto alternativo, ndr) condividono alcuni obiettivi strategici con i loro predecessori. Non sopportano le restrizioni di un sistema internazionale che non concede agli Stati autoritari il diritto di espandersi a spese dei vicini più piccoli. Cercano di dominare le loro aree per assicurarsi un controllo economico a lungo termine sul mondo, soprattutto a fini domestici. Abbracciano ideologie – il nazional-fascismo russo con la sua mescolanza di razzismo gerarchico e nostalgia sovietica; il khomeinismo iraniano con le sue pretese universaliste e il suo antisemitismo, il totalitarismo cinese con il suo culto della personalità – che sono nemiche del liberalismo, del governo rappresentativo, dei bilanciamenti tra poteri nello Stato di diritto».

La difficoltà di coordinamento delle tre potenze del Nuovo Asse

Proprio come negli anni Trenta e Quaranta del secolo scorso, le tre potenze del Nuovo Asse hanno delle difficoltà a coordinarsi. In parte questo è legato alle profonde differenze ideologiche tra loro: il fanatismo islamico che comanda in Iran è odiato da Putin e Xi (e represso nei rispettivi paesi), anche se vi trovano un alleato utile per disfare l’ordine occidento-centrico. Lo temono anche perché l’islamismo di Teheran è l’unica ideologia veramente universale, visto che si rivolge a un miliardo e mezzo di musulmani dal Maghreb all’Indonesia, più le tante comunità d’immigrati in Occidente; mentre né il putinismo né il totalitarismo cinese hanno lo stesso appeal universale.

Inoltre le tre potenze hanno interessi di lungo periodo divergenti. Non è difficile immaginare un futuro conflittuale tra Cina e Russia quando sarà evidente – e sempre più umiliante – la colonizzazione economica della seconda da parte della prima. Un eventuale successo delle mire iraniane per l’egemonia nel Golfo danneggerebbe sia la Russia (concorrente nella produzione di energie fossili) sia la Cina (prima importatrice mondiale di petrolio e gas).

Ma anche Hitler Mussolini e Hirohito ebbero interessi divergenti e perfino conflittuali; ciò non impedì che unissero le loro forze con l’obiettivo di distruggere un ordine internazionale guidato dai loro nemici. Per adesso siamo a quella fase, per il Nuovo Asse. «La Russia – scrive Cropsey – cerca di assorbire l’Ucraina (e insieme ad essa Moldovia e Bielorussia), dominare il Caucaso, sottrarre la Turchia al campo occidentale, infine conquistare i Paesi Baltici, creando così un blocco capace di sfidare direttamente l’Occidente. L’Iran conduce una guerra di logoramento contro Israele con l’obiettivo di inondarlo di vittime e distruggerne l’economia. Abbattendo le fondamenta politiche dello Stato ebraico, e in parallelo attaccando le basi americane in Medio Oriente, l’Iran spera di usare la sua vittoria contro l’alleanza Usa-Israele per attirare ogni sorta di islamisti sotto le sue bandiere, proiettandosi alla guida dell’intero mondo islamico».

La Cina per adesso… sta a guardare, pur manifestando attivamente le proprie simpatie con il Nuovo Asse (non ha mai condannato né l’invasione dell’Ucraina né la mattanza di civili israeliani da parte di Hamas; ha irrobustito i suoi legami economici sia con Mosca sia con Teheran). All’apparenza Xi Jinping si accontenta di lucrare vantaggi dalle distrazioni di risorse americane verso altre zone del «rimland eurasiatico»: armi e munizioni, intelligence e capitale politico Usa vengono spesi a piene mani prima in Ucraina e ora in Medio Oriente. Di questa distrazione americana Pechino già ha cominciato a profittare con un succedersi di azioni militari aggressive verso i suoi vicini (Taiwan, Filippine). Xi e Putin potrebbero anche delegare alla Corea del Nord un terzo conflitto nel Pacifico, proprio come l’Iran ha delegato ad Hamas l’attacco contro Israele.

Il terzo fronte? Siamo noi

Non ci è dato sapere se e quando verrà aperto un nuovo fronte, in quella che il Papa chiama la Terza guerra mondiale. Secondo altre analisi, invece, il terzo fronte è già aperto da tempo: siamo noi. Lo spettacolo di masse giovanili che in Occidente sfilano dietro slogan pro-Hamas; congiungendosi con cortei di immigrati islamici che condividono gli stessi slogan per le vie di Londra e New York: visto con gli occhi di Xi, Putin, Khamenei, questo forse è il terzo fronte. Un mix tra gli effetti destabilizzanti di un’immigrazione incontrollata, e la diffusione metastatica di ideologie anti-occidentali nel cuore dell’Occidente; con le contro-reazioni elettorali che portano alla vittoria Geert Wilders in Olanda, domani forse al ritorno di Donald Trump alla Casa Bianca.

I tre leader del Nuovo Asse totalitario, Xi Putin e Khamenei, hanno tutti e tre nella loro formazione culturale il senso della storia quale si dipana nei tempi lunghi, e pensano che i tempi giocano a sfavore dell’Occidente, viste le manifestazioni vistose del suo decadentismo. Dei tre, quello che ha anche le maggiori risorse economiche e tecnologiche per resistere a una guerra di posizione nel lungo termine, è Xi Jinping. Forse anche per questo è lui a concedersi il lusso di «rinviare» un’altra guerra calda nel cortile di casa sua.

L’analisi sull’Occidente «culturalmente molle»

Pur con le divisioni ideologiche che li caratterizzano, i jihadisti sunniti di Hamas, gli ayatollah sciiti di Teheran, Putin e Xi convergono su una descrizione dei loro avversari come «soft», culturalmente molli. Hamas ha interpretato le lacerazioni della società civile israeliana (le grandi battaglie contro i progetti di riforma giudiziaria di Netanyahu) come un segnale di debolezza; gli ayatollah iraniani sono convinti che la società israeliana per effetto del benessere economico di oggi stia diventando meno marziale e meno disposta a sostenere una guerra di lunga durata. Putin e Xi fanno la stessa analisi sulle società europee e americana, che hanno abbandonato patriottismo ed etica del sacrificio come fossero disvalori da ripudiare. Putin sembra aver sbagliato la sua analisi sul popolo ucraino, che si è rivelato finora più combattivo di quanto lui credesse. (Forse avrebbe avuto vita più facile invadendo la Germania). In Cina circolano analisi simili sulla società di Taiwan: troppo abituata al benessere per voler sacrificare la vita in difesa della libertà.

I nazisti, i fascisti, i militaristi giapponesi avevano giudizi simili sulle società americana inglese e francese negli anni Trenta e Quaranta: decadenti, moralmente dissolute, quindi inadatte a combattere. La storia fu quasi sul punto di dargli ragione. Se avessero vinto le correnti isolazioniste negli Stati Uniti, se Franklin Roosevelt non avesse avuto il «pretesto» di Pearl Harbor per intervenire nel Pacifico e in Europa, gli eventi potevano seguire un percorso molto diverso. Questo porta alla conclusione convergente degli analisti conservatori sulla National Reviewl’America non deve stare a guardare, ciascuno dei conflitti dall’Ucraina all’Israele la riguarda in modo vitale, un ritorno all’isolazionismo avrebbe conseguenze terribili.

Sul controllo del «rimland» eurasiatico si gioca la sopravvivenza del mondo libero e quindi l’interesse strategico degli Usa. La leadership americana – a differenza di quanto pensa Trump – va esercitata con senso di misura e pragmatismo, ma non deve ritirarsi.

28 novembre 2023, 16:55 - modifica il 28 novembre 2023 | 17:21

© RIPRODUZIONE RISERVATA

WOLF WARRIOR COMES TO OUR SIDE!

America keeps its advantage over China

The nation and its allies remain more united and powerful than Beijing’s group of malcontents

Martin Wolf martin.wolf@ft.com · Nov 29, 2023


Not long ago, “most governments had believed that closer economic integration would promote long-term prosperity. Now, integration is seen as a source of risk and insecurity.” This is how London-based Capital Economics introduces an intriguing analysis of “the shape of the fractured world economy in 2024”. Economics and politics always interact. Today, however, politics has become more important. Its concept then is of a global economy being reshaped by fraught relations between the US and China.

Capital Economics argues that countries can be divided into five groups: the US and its close allies; countries that lean towards the US; the unaligned; those that lean towards China; and China and its close allies. The first group consists of the US and Canada, Europe (except Hungary), Japan, Australia and New Zealand. The second group includes, above all, India, but also Colombia, Mexico, Morocco, Turkey and South Korea. The unaligned group includes, significantly, Brazil, Indonesia and Nigeria. The group of countries leaning towards China includes Argentina (true, until a few days ago!), much of Africa (including South Africa), Iraq, Kazakhstan and, suggests Capital Economics, Saudi Arabia. Finally, China’s strong allies include Russia, Iran and Pakistan.

A fundamental distinction exists between the first group and all others. The high-income democracies share core values (although whether they continue to do so will depend on the results of the 2024 US presidential election). The other groupings are defined far more by what they are against than what they are for. Russia and Iran are allies of convenience for China, and vice versa. They share an enemy. But they are still very different from one another. Yet such alliances of convenience can shape both economic and political relationships. The enemy of my enemy may, for a while, indeed be a good friend. Here then are some relevant data. The China bloc accounts for half of the world’s (non-Antarctic) land mass, compared with 35 per cent for the US bloc. It is also home to slightly more of the world’s people (46 per cent, against 43 per cent). But it still generates only 27 per cent of the world’s GDP, nearly all of that in China itself, compared with 67 per cent in the US bloc. This is because, crucially, most of the world’s highincome countries are in the latter.

The ways that balance might change is for the US bloc to disintegrate, probably under Donald Trump, or for the Chinese economy to grow faster than Capital Economics now expects. The latter’s pessimism on China’s prospects may be excessive, but it is far from absurd. China does, indeed, face strong headwinds against high growth over the next quarter of a century. (See charts.)

Unsurprisingly, the China bloc is more important in industry than in GDP. Thus, its share of world industrial output was 38 per cent in 2022, against 55 per cent for the US bloc. Whether China’s bloc reaches equality in industry over the next quarter century depends mainly on the performance of Indian manufacturing relative to China’s. In agriculture, the China bloc generates 49 per cent of output, compared with 38 per cent for the US bloc, because it contains many commodity producers.

In 2022, 144 countries traded more goods with China than with the US. The US was the bigger trading partner for only 60 countries. But half of global goods trade was among countries classed as in the US bloc. This wider perspective is really useful. Germany, for example, is widely thought to be the US ally with the tightest trade links with China. But only 11 per cent of its goods trade was with the China bloc in the second quarter of 2023, while 86 per cent was with others in the US bloc, principally its European partners.

In financial activities and capital flows, the US bloc remains dominant. While its place in foreign direct investment has shrunk over the last quarter of a century, it still accounted for 84 per cent of the total FDI stock by investor country and 87 per cent by recipient in 2022. This is because the world’s dominant corporations and the most attractive destinations remain within it. This gap will not close under Xi Jinping.

Some 86 per cent of global portfolio investment also lies within the US bloc and only 2 per cent within the China bloc. FDI between the US and China blocs is three times FDI within the China bloc: Russia and Iran may be China’s allies of convenience, but only fools would put much of their capital in such economically benighted petrostates. Chinese investors are not such fools.

Foreign exchange reserves still predominantly consist of assets denominated in the US currency and those of its allies. In the second half of 2023, these accounted for 87 per cent of foreign currency reserves, only a little down from 89 per cent three years earlier. This is because only these countries supply liquid long-term financial assets. They may not be as safe as they used to be, given the use of sanctions. But no good alternatives exist. China is most unlikely to wish to supply them, since that would require liberalisation and opening of its financial markets, including markets in Chinese public debt.

Many countries wish to see the US and its allies, the dominant powers of the last two centuries, taken down more than just a peg or two. But they are more united and economically powerful than China’s group of malcontents. The event likely to change this balance quickly would be a US decision to tear its alliances to pieces. That would be one of the most dramatically self-harming acts in global history. It would take far longer for the China bloc to surpass the US bloc on all relevant aspects of economic weight. It may never do so.

 

Opinion | Don’t Count on Economic Woes to Deter China

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China doubtless has problems. Many commentators have asked if we’ve reached “peak China,” the point at which demographic headwinds and self-destructive economic policies combine to slow the once mighty engine of the Chinese economy, perhaps for good.

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But there is good reason to be skeptical that China’s economic difficulties will on their own prevent conflict. Building a first-class military and reclaiming Taiwan are among President Xi Jinping’s priorities. Even if the economy sags and Mr. Xi has to cut back in other areas, the military will get the funds it needs. The Pentagon’s recently released annual report on Chinese military and security developments makes clear that, notwithstanding a significant slowdown in China’s rate of economic growth, Beijing “can support continued growth in defense spending for at least the next five to 10 years.”

Economic pain may actually be a feature of Mr. Xi’s strategy, not a bug. He thinks the U.S. is weak and unwilling to suffer hardship. China endured the Great Leap Forward (1958-62) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) and still held together, albeit through intense repression and at the expense of tens of millions of Chinese lives. In the event of a Taiwan conflict, sanctions and supply-chain disruptions would wreak havoc on the global economy. Even if China were harder hit, Mr. Xi might bet that Western societies would buckle first, particularly given his proactive steps to prepare for war. As Mr. Xi put it at the start of the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, China must “prepare for a rainy day, and be ready to withstand major tests of high winds and high waves.”

Additionally, Communist Party leaders may perceive a near-term window of relative advantage before China’s structural problems grow even worse. Scholars Hal Brands and Michael Beckley have warned that the middle to late 2020s could pose a particularly dangerous window for Taiwan for precisely this reason.

At the same time, high unemployment, economic stagnation and popular discontent are existential challenges for the Communist Party. An invasion of Taiwan might provide an effective distraction. If Mr. Xi can’t provide jobs for China’s young people—youth unemployment reached 21% this summer before the Chinese government decided it should stop reporting the figure—or hit previous growth targets, a successful conquest of Taiwan might become more, not less, desirable. If anything, it could become a gambit to jump-start growth, put people to work and unite the country.

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Other authoritarian countries have waged war despite domestic economic challenges. Consider Russia under Vladimir Putin. After years of strong growth in the mid-2000s, the Russian economy slowed beginning with the 2008 financial crisis. In the year leading up to the 2014 invasion of Ukraine, Russia grew at less than 2%. Declining oil prices and sanctions have since put a damper on the nation’s economy. Between the 2014 and 2022 invasions of Ukraine, Russia’s growth averaged barely 1%. Nevertheless, Mr. Putin invaded and kept his war machine running, which caused further economic pain in the face of additional sanctions.

Another relevant example is Imperial Japan during the interwar period. Like China today, Japan saw a long boom give way to stagnation, with annual growth falling from an average of 6.2% in 1914-20 to 1.8% in 1921-29, and then to 0.7% in 1930-31 as Japan, like the rest of the world, battled the Great Depression.

The final two years are particularly instructive. The effects of the global crash combined with an abrupt appreciation of the yen, stemming from Japan’s return to the gold standard, led to a paralyzing economic contraction called the Showa Depression. The Showa Depression didn’t, however, temper Japan’s external ambitions. As the nation’s economy was contracting, Tokyo—which had three years earlier signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war—invaded Manchuria in September 1931, kicking off the chain of events that would later lead to total war in the Pacific.

The Chinese Communist Party’s recent behavior contradicts Mr. Biden’s hypothesis. As the Chinese economy has slowed, Chinese coast guard and maritime militia vessels have rammed Filipino coast guard and military-resupply ships in the South China Sea. The Philippines is a U.S. ally. The Chinese military has conducted more than 180 unsafe and unprofessional intercepts of U.S. forces over the past two years—a dangerous spike that has brought U.S. and Chinese forces within feet of deadly collisions. China’s threats to Taiwan also escalate daily, including unprecedented incursions by People’s Liberation Army forces over the “median line” in the Taiwan Strait.

War with China isn’t inevitable. But we can’t rely on an economic deus ex machina to prevent a conflict. Rather than wager peace on wishful thinking, American policy makers—from the president to Congress—must move heaven and earth to deter China and prevent a conflict before it is too late.

Mr. Gallagher, a Republican, represents Wisconsin’s Eighth Congressional District and is chairman of the House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the U.S. and the Chinese Communist Party.

Journal Editorial Report:What was accomplished by applauding China's leader? Images: Zuma Press Composite: Mark Kelly

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Appeared in the November 29, 2023, print edition as 'Don’t Count on Economic Woes to Deter China'.

XI, WHO MUST BE SLAUGHTERED, NOT OBEYED!

 

Xi should learn from Ukraine’s battlefields

The Times

Taiwan’s election in the coming weeks is said, by the opposition at least, to be a choice between war and peace. The logic is simple: the opposition parties favour a closer working relationship with mainland China and will therefore be wary of provoking Xi Jinping.

By contrast the favourite from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, Lai Ching-te, champions Taiwan’s distinctive identity, its claims to nationhood and close ties to the United States. If he wins, Taiwan will be a thorn in Xi’s side.

Lai could be beaten, even without the anticipated covert Chinese interference, if the two opposition parties could only agree on a joint candidate for president. Last week, at an embarrassingly mismanaged press conference in Taipei, they failed to do that.

Why does this local spat matter to the rest of the world? It’s this: Xi’s hopes of a peaceful takeover of Taiwan will shrink if Lai becomes president. And Beijing applying military force becomes more feasible.

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The election on January 13 could become the first big geopolitical crisis of 2024, the wars in Ukraine and Gaza notwithstanding. The San Francisco summit between Joe Biden and Xi Jinping may have briefly improved the tone of the conversation between the US and China but, apart from the restoration of a military hotline, there has been no substantial progress on making Taiwan less of a flashpoint.

Is war creeping closer to Taiwan? Is China, as some US analysts believe, going to build up its forces and be ready for an invasion in 2027? Or is it prepared to go earlier, calculating that the US is already overstretched and distracted?

The decision has not been taken, it seems, and Xi will certainly watch carefully to see if a victorious President Lai turns into an openly defiant leader. But the fine-tuning of Xi’s big decision — open war, covert war or a prickly status quo — is changing almost daily. It is influenced by his intelligence analysts’ assessment of US intentions.

Is Biden able or willing, Xi will need to know, to fight a three-front war? The US has fought such wars before but its defence industry has always been able to outproduce its opponents. Now the talk around Ukraine is of American and western ammunition shortages; the defence of Taiwan would burn up huge amounts of bullets, shells and fighter aircraft. Resupply would be a problem for the west.

America, in other words — under this president, or the next — might think twice about mounting a large-scale challenge to a Chinese invasion. China’s navy is already bigger, in overall numbers, than the US fleet. It is growing by the equivalent of the size of the French navy every four years.

There are other considerations. The San Francisco summit revealed that any attempt by the US and its allies to deploy sanctions against China anywhere near the size and potency of those being applied against Russia would lead to a massive disruption of the global economy. China is a major holder of US debt, a power that can be weaponised. And despite the tough talk, the dollar value of American trade with China rose to a record high in 2022.

American engine-makers operate dozens of factories in China, soy bean farmers in the upper Midwest sell billions of dollars of beans to China to feed their pigs. You can take effective punitive action against Russia for its invasion but sanctions against China for a Taiwan invasion could turn out to be an act of self-harm for the US and not just in an election year.

All this could tip Xi in favour of early military action against Taiwan. What he calls the “reunification” with Taiwan is central to his promise of a national rebirth; he seems to see it as an essential completion of his legacy. But what if he loses the war, the first significant Chinese war since the 1970s?

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The Russian campaign in Ukraine should be flashing warning signs. Russia, according to intelligence estimates, has lost more than 300,000 troops; the past six weeks have been particularly bloody. Even with China’s huge population, those kind of losses would be enough, in a country whose attitudes were shaped by a one-child policy, to trigger dissent.

Covid lockdown kicked off popular protests; mass deployment of the country’s young men could have a similar impact. Russia’s war has shrunk its global influence, exposed weaknesses in the military and prompted a mutiny by mercenaries. Not encouraging signs for a political friend wondering whether he should sharpen his sabre.

There have been plenty of criticisms of the Biden administration and most of his European allies for withholding potentially war-winning weaponry from the Ukrainians. But there is another strategic lesson from American behaviour which Xi should take on board. It’s that the US is still ready to support long wars, that it has the strategic patience, and can even claim this to be a kind of victory over aggressor states and their increasingly exhausted leaders.

Ukraine may not have won its land back but it has trapped Vladimir Putin in an unwinnable war; he can only move backwards. The Chinese military calculation on Taiwan is almost certainly based on an economic blockade followed by cyber-blackout, a long-range bombardment and an amphibious attack. That would have to be carried out unfeasibly quickly before the US became involved and transformed the terms of battle.

The Russians have shown how not to run a blitzkrieg. Now Xi should draw the conclusions, confine his troops to barracks and concentrate on making his people as happy and as free as they are in Taiwan. A great many mothers will thank him for it.

KILL EVERY HAMAS HUMAN CELL!

 

How to Kill a Palestinian State

A Palestinian flag is held up against a dark blue sky with the sun behind it.
Credit... Spencer Colby/The Canadian Press, via Associated Press
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Do the people chanting “Free Palestine” and “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free” have any idea of the irreparable harm they’re doing to any hope of Palestinian sovereignty?

For decades, the question of a Palestinian state has come down to two dates: 1948 and 1967. Most Western supporters of Palestinian statehood have argued that the key date is the Six-Day War of June 1967, when Israel, faced with open threats of annihilation, took possession of the Golan Heights, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula.

According to this line of thinking, the way to peace rested on Arab diplomatic recognition of Israel in exchange for the return of these so-called occupied territories. That’s what happened between Egypt and Israel at Camp David in 1978, and what might have happened at Camp David in 2000 if Yasir Arafat had only accepted the offer of full statehood made to him by Prime Minister Ehud Barak of Israel.

Yet there has always been a second narrative, which dates “the occupation” not to 1967 but to 1948, when Israel came into being as a sovereign state. By this argument, it isn’t just East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Golan Heights that are occupied by Israel: It’s Haifa, Tel Aviv, Eilat and West Jerusalem, too. For Palestine to be “liberated,” Israel itself must end.

Starting in the 1970s, the 1948ers were known as the rejectionist front. More recently, they have become the axis of resistance. Membership includes Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Assad regime in Syria and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps — a who’s who of designated terrorist groups and their state sponsors.

On Oct. 7, the axis of resistance became the face of the Palestinian movement. On Oct. 8, demonstrators around the world chose to embrace that axis. Sometimes they did so unwittingly, believing there was no contradiction between being pro-Palestinian and supporting Israel’s right to exist, or not understanding the implications of the slogans they were chanting.

But just as often they have done so wittingly. When Mohamed Khairullah, the mayor of Prospect Park, N.J., said “75 years of occupation is too long” at an October rally, he was embracing the 1948 narrative. When Rashida Tlaib, the Michigan congresswoman, posted that “75 years later, the Nakba continues to this day” and declined to accept Israel as a Jewish state, she was embracing it. When Judith Butler, the Berkeley professor, told an interviewer that “the roots of the problem are in a state formation that depended on expulsions and land theft to establish its own ‘legitimacy’” and supported a binational state, she was embracing it. When the Los Angeles chapter of Black Lives Matter responded to the Oct. 7 massacres with a Facebook post claiming, “When a people have been subject to decades of apartheid and unimaginable violence, their resistance must not be condemned, but understood as a desperate act of self-defense,” it was embracing it. When the BBC Arabic service repeatedly described ordinary Israelis as “settlers,” it was embracing it.

Such embraces have consequences.

For one, they put a growing fraction of the progressive left objectively on the side of some of the worst people on earth — and in radical contradiction with their professed values.

“A left that, rightly, demands absolute condemnation of white-nationalist supremacy refuses to disassociate itself from Islamist supremacy,” Susie Linfield, a professor of journalism at N.Y.U., wrote in an important recent essay in the online journal Quillette. “A left that lauds intersectionality hasn’t noticed that Hamas’s axis of support consists of Iran, famous most recently for killing hundreds of protesters demanding women’s freedom.”

For another, they reinforce the central convictions and deepest fears of the Israeli right: that Palestinians have never reconciled themselves to the existence of Israel in any borders, that every Israeli territorial or diplomatic concession is seen by Palestinians as evidence of weakness, that a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank would only serve as a launchpad for an intensified assault on Israel, that every criticism of Israeli policies in the occupied territories veils a deep-seated hatred of the Jewish state.

When the left embraces the zero-sum politics of Palestinian resistance, it merely encourages the zero-sum politics of hard-core Israeli settlers and their supporters.

A third consequence is that it abandons the Palestinian people to their worst leaders. It’s bad enough that the West has long accepted, and funded, Mahmoud Abbas’s repressive kleptocracy based in Ramallah. But what Hamas has given the people over whom it rules is infinitely worse: theocratic despotism, soaked in the blood of Palestinian “martyrs,” most of whom never signed themselves or their families up to serve as human shields in an endless — and, in the long run, hopeless — battle with Israel.

It’s fine for Israel’s harshest critics to ask hard questions of Israel’s leaders. But when those same critics stop asking equally hard questions of Palestinian leaders, they are not advocating a cause. They are merely submitting to a regime.

The world, including Israel, has a common interest in an eventual Palestinian state that cares more about building itself up than tearing its neighbors down; that invests its energy in future prosperity, not past glory; that accepts compromise and rejects fanaticism. Since Oct. 7, the loudest professed champions of the Palestinian cause have advocated the precise opposite. It may be a recipe for smug self-satisfaction, but it’s also how to kill a Palestinian state.

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The Old Military-Industrial Complex Won’t Win a New Cold War

China’s rapid advances as a military superpower demand a more creative partnership between Western governments and companies and universities.

Yesterday’s weapons won’t win tomorrow’s wars.
Yesterday’s weapons won’t win tomorrow’s wars. Photographer: HUM Images/Universal Images Group Editorial
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The West has long assumed that it enjoys a substantial technological advantage over any potential military rival. But for how much longer? The People’s Liberation Army is not only challenging the West in terms of conventional and nuclear weaponry — China’s navy is now the biggest in the world, and its nuclear arsenal may reach 1,000 warheads by 2030, according to the US Department of Defense. It is roaring ahead in high-tech. China has overtaken the West in hypersonic missiles — those capable of traveling at five times the speed of sound and evading air defenses. It is also pioneering lasers, orbiting space robots and high-altitude balloons.

The phrase du jour in the PLA is “intelligentized warfare”: that is, applying AI techniques, such as machine learning and human-machine teaming, to military decision-making or to weapons systems (drone swarms or unmanned vehicles); “cognitive domain operations,” combining psychological warfare with cyber operations to shape public opinion); and something called “brain science.” The invaluable 2023 US Department of Defense report on military and security developments in China claims mysteriously that “in 2021, Beijing funded the China Brain Plan, a major research project aimed at using brain science to develop new biotechnology and AI applications.”

I recently spent a couple of days at a conference on security in a Scottish country house — the sort of meeting where people wear medals with their dinner jackets and greet each other with “the last time I saw you was in Tora Bora.” I was struck both by how worried my fellow guests were by the pace of China’s military advance (“they can innovate and scale up more rapidly than we can”) and by the strength of China’s President Xi Jinping’s determination to reshape the global order. Serious people thought that an invasion of Taiwan before 2030 was more likely than not. I was also struck by how frustrated people were about how blase the general public (and consequently many politicians) are about the problem, given that it could lead to war or, at the very least, a change in the balance of power between liberalism and authoritarianism.

There was a general consensus that we urgently need to speed up the West’s progress and slow down China’s if we are not to see such a shift. No consensus emerged about how exactly we can do this but, as I listened to the discussion, two points kept leaping out at me.

The first was that we need to harness what is best in Western capitalism to revitalize our military-industrial complex — in other words, disrupt ourselves in order to improve ourselves. The defense industry often embodies everything that is worst in modern capitalism: Giant incumbent companies carve up the military market between themselves and offer comfortable jobs to senior military people when they retire. Their chief expertise often lies in gaming the Pentagon’s convoluted procurement system rather than in developing innovative weapons systems — and they have little relationship with the vortex of creativity that goes under the name of “Silicon Valley.”

Indeed, some cynics joke that the real communists are now in the US rather than China: The Pentagon operates a command-and-control system while the Chinese are trying to reach out beyond state-owned enterprises to a new generation of entrepreneurs, venture capitalists and “new-type” laboratories that draw funding from both the public and private sectors. But in some ways, this caricature understates the problem: The most talented Western tech people naturally flow into the private sector — why defend civilization when you can make a fortune designing video games? — whereas the Chinese military has the pick of the country’s top tech talent. The most significant breakthroughs with space travel and satellite communications are all being made by the private sector.

Thankfully, the US is making some progress in re-introducing the spirit of capitalism into the military-industrial complex. The Pentagon’s attempt to cultivate relations with Silicon Valley companies is finally paying off, despite internal opposition: Witness the successful deals struck with Palantir Technologies Inc., a data manager, and Anduril Industries Inc., a startup that makes drones and surveillance systems. The Army’s new Futures Command has also been situated in the tech hub that is Austin, Texas. Last year, the Biden administration blocked Lockheed Martin Corp.’s $4.4 billion acquisition of engine maker Aerojet Rocketdyne Holdings Inc. on anti-competitive grounds and requested $115 million to fund an office of strategic capital.

Real capitalists are also discovering the defense sector. Elon Musk’s Space X is doing work for the Pentagon. Several venture capital funds such as America’s Frontier FundShield Capital and Lux Capital Management are focusing on the defense sector, in part because other openings such as crypto have fizzled out. One of the most positive developments is the emergence of a new generation of military high-flyers who see their post-retirement future not in working for one of the principals but in establishing defense-focused companies or venture funds.

The second is that the West needs to make much better use of its leading universities. We are unperturbed about students from the People’s Republic studying high-tech in our top universities. Yet whereas from 1978-2007 only 25% of the 1.2 million PRC students who went abroad to study returned home, providing a brain boost for the West, from 2007 to 2017 that proportion had risen to 80%. A growing proportion are sent by the Chinese military in order to gather advanced know-how. We should start replacing them with students from friendlier countries.

At the same time, we are negligent about cultivating relations between academia and the military. There are some notable exceptions: Stanford University can boast the Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation, the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation, the Stanford Technology Ventures Program, and the Hoover Institution. “Hacking for Defense,” an academic curriculum that focuses on defense innovation, is taught in more than 60 US universities.

crash_course_tout

But too many universities remain defense-free or defense-hostile zones. Several conference participants lamented that strategic studies have all but died in the United Kingdom outside King’s College, London, and Sandhurst. There was also a strong feeling that business schools do remarkably little to focus on military-related themes given the size of the defense industry and the easy gains to be had from making the sector more entrepreneurial. Where are the lectures on applying “lean” or “agile” to the Pentagon? Or the case studies on the danger of consolidation in the defense industry? Or the articles on the importance of the case for adding another “S” (security) to the ESG (environmental, social and governance formula)?

The West’s success in the Cold War depended on the creative relationship between the Pentagon and two other elements: mighty corporations and leading academic institutions. The companies made sure the West was ahead in manufacturing high-tech weaponry. And the universities provided innovative brainpower. Now that the world is settling into another Cold War, this relationship must be reinvented for a new world of faster innovation and more flexible corporations.

Monday 27 November 2023

SUFFER, YE RATS!

Property woes leave a trail of loss and stress across China

Investors, buyers and families count cost of real estate behemoth’s failure

THOMAS HALE IN SHANGHAI GLORIA LI AND CHAN HO-HIM HONG KONG · Nov 28, 2023


A swath of unfinished apartment blocks across China, indebted buyers uncertain if they will ever move into their new homes and anger at the loss of their deposits — the impact of China’s property crisis has been immense.

The 2021 default of Evergrande, the world’s most indebted developer, and dozens of its peers ushered in a new era for China’s property sector.

Evergrande, which faces the threat of liquidation, embodies the turmoil of a sector that accounts for roughly a quarter of China’s economic activity and is the most important component of household wealth.

Residential property prices were up almost a third in the first quarter of this year compared with a decade ago, according to data compiled by the Bank for International Settlements, but fell 5 per cent between the third quarter of 2021 and the first quarter of this year.

Developers, whose fortunes are intertwined with the local governments that sell them land and the investors who back them, have struggled to recover amid a wider lack of confidence. Four people who invested in property tell of their experiences:

Anhui

Zhang, 42, a make-up artist from the city of Hefei, had hoped to move into her new flat with her elderly parents in August. But two years after she paid a deposit for a 667 sq ft flat costing Rmb580,000 ($80,000) it is still not finished and she has not been able to get her deposit back from Evergrande.

“I emptied my savings to cover the deposit and downpayment of a total of Rmb350,000” for the flat, she said. “I don’t dare tell my parents the news. If I did, they would be worried sick.”

Zhang, who did not want her full name to be published, works in nail art, wedding make-up and theatres to meet the mortgage on her current apartment. She now regrets not taking rumours of Evergrande’s troubles seriously. “How can the [government] allow it to collapse? How can this happen?” she said.

“I paid my part, and [Evergrande] is not delivering,” she said. “How can I not be emotional? I can’t sleep at night. I have lost my hair. I can’t even take a proper break.”

She is not alone. About a quarter of the roughly 200 flats in the project have been sold. Local authorities told her that buyers had remitted about Rmb27mn to Evergrande for that site alone.

Evergrande did not respond to requests for comment.

In recent weeks, Zhang and other buyers have protested at local government offices and Evergrande’s sales offices, including a sit-in outside the district office. Armed police showed up and made them leave, she said.

Later, she received phone calls from officials telling her not to organise any more protests. “I didn’t get what I paid for. And they [government officials] told me to bottle up my emotions,” said Zhang. “Couldn’t I cry a little about the grievance I have?”

Shanghai

Like many young people, Summer Wang aspired to own her own place and get married. Soon after she graduated from university in Shanghai in 2008 she managed to do both. Her in-laws helped with the 30 per cent deposit for the Rmb600,000 apartment for her and her husband. In 2013 she bought a larger flat for her parents. In 2021 she sold the first flat for Rmb3.5mn and the second for an undisclosed sum.

But Shanghai’s overhaul in 2021 of rules governing house purchases — part of Beijing’s push to curb leverage and prices in the wake of Evergrande’s collapse — has made it more difficult to buy new apartments.

Potential buyers must enter a lottery to win the right to buy new property. Those who do not have a house are prioritised. After seven attempts Wang secured a lottery spot at the end of last year, buying a new property at the beginning of 2023.

Last month she completed the purchase of a used property — buyers typically prefer new builds — for Rmb2.9mn. She bought this property for her parents.

The crisis means not everyone can buy a property before they marry. Many are “waiting for prices to go down a bit more” before they buy, Wang said. “Some sellers also think that if they wait a little longer then the government may roll out more policies so that they can sell at a higher price. That’s what I see now, sellers and buyers are hesitating.”

Guangdong

Gary Lai, a chef who runs a Michelinrecommended noodle soup restaurant in Hong Kong, is still waiting for the roughly 1,000 sq ft apartment he bought in Zhaoqing two years ago for Rmb1.1mn to be finished.

But given it was developed by stateowned Overseas Chinese Town Enterprises, he is optimistic it will be ready next year and is bullish on the market.

Lai, who is in his 50s, plans to move to the city of Zhaoqing when he retires. He is even considering buying a second flat in the city to provide him with steady rental income in retirement.

“China’s development is rapid and is a pioneer in many sectors,” he said. “I imagine living in mainland China would be satisfying . . . especially given the lower cost of living there.”

Since Lai has no plans to sell the property, falling prices do not alarm him. A weaker renminbi and Chinese interest rate cuts make property in the mainland attractive for Hongkongers, he added. “This might be the best time to buy newly completed properties.”

Jiangxi

Emily, a business owner in her 30s who lives in Shanghai, could not afford to buy a flat in China’s most populous city. Instead, as with many others, she and her British husband opted to buy in Shangrao, her home town.

In 2021, she paid Rmb620,000 for an Evergrande apartment. The price was discounted because she paid in cash and because the flat was on the 14th floor, a number deemed unlucky in China because “four” and “death” are homophones.

When the company’s severe liquidity problems began to mount later that year she said buyers in a 500-person WeChat group were quick to petition the local government. Her father joined others to appeal to local politicians about the development.

Since then, she said, the project has been supported by the local government, according to an Evergrande representative in the WeChat group, and her apartment is expected to be completed within a year.

“Most people who bought [there], they probably only have Rmb1mn and spent all their money on it,” said Emily, who did not want her full name to be published.

She is in the process of buying a second property in the city, an apartment on the market for Rmb1.3mn, a 30 per cent discount on the previous asking price.

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Attaque au couteau à Dublin : le profil de l’assaillant alimente la colère anti-migrants

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Jeudi 23 novembre, un assaillant d’origine algérienne faisait quatre blessés dont trois enfants lors d’une attaque au couteau devant une école de Dublin.
Jeudi 23 novembre, un assaillant d’origine algérienne faisait quatre blessés dont trois enfants lors d’une attaque au couteau devant une école de Dublin. CLODAGH KILCOYNE / REUTERS

Malgré le mutisme des enquêteurs irlandais, les fuites dans la presse confirment que l’assaillant est un Irlandais d’origine algérienne, un temps sous le coup d’un ordre d’expulsion.

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Le profil de l'auteur de la sauvage attaque au couteau de Dublin ne peut que nourrir la polémique sur l'immigration en Irlande. D'origine algérienne mais de nationalité irlandaise, l'homme avait déjà eu maille à partir avec la justice. Et avait un temps été sous le coup d'une expulsion. L'attaque a fait quatre blessés dont trois enfants. Une femme d'une trentaine d'années et une petite fille de cinq ans ont été grièvement touchées.

Sur l'assaillant et ses mobiles, la police irlandaise reste bien silencieuse mais des fuites permettent à la presse de brosser peu à peu son portrait. Âgé d'une cinquantaine d'années, l'homme était arrivé d'Algérie dans le pays il y a plus de deux décennies et avait été arrêté en 2003. « Il devait alors être expulsé mais il s'est battu pendant cinq ans contre cette décision » a confié au Sunday Times une source policière. Après une procédure de révision devant la Haute Cour, l'ordre d'expulsion a été révoqué. Et, en 2008, le ministère de la Justice a accordé au migrant algérien une autorisation de séjour en Irlande. Plus tard, il a obtenu la nationalité irlandaise, qu'il détient depuis plus de dix ans.

Violences inédites

Récemment, l'homme avait été dans le collimateur de la justice. En juin dernier, il avait comparu devant un tribunal de Dublin pour port d'un couteau et dommages criminels à une voiture, après un incident survenu en mai. Le juge n'avait finalement pas rendu ordonnance, semble-t-il à cause de « graves problèmes de santé mentale ». Hier la presse avançait d'ailleurs que les policiers attendaient le feu vert des médecins pour interroger l'attaquant, sous garde armée dans un hôpital de Dublin. Il souffre en effet de blessures à la tête, et était par ailleurs dans « une sorte d'épisode psychotique lorsqu'il a attaqué les enfants et l'employée de la crèche ». Selon le Daily Mail, l'homme vivait dans un foyer de la municipalité de Dublin avant de déchaîner sa violence dans le centre de la capitale jeudi après-midi.

Très rapidement jeudi, la rumeur avait couru sur les réseaux sociaux que l'attaquant était d'origine étrangère. Et des violences inédites avaient éclaté dans Dublin, quelque 500 émeutiers incendiant des véhicules, pillant des commerces et s'en prenant aux forces de l'ordre. Des manifestants brandissaient des drapeaux irlandais et des pancartes « Irish Lives Matter » (« les vies irlandaises comptent »). Ce discours a été relayé par la star irlandaise du MMA, Conor McGregor, suivie par des millions de personnes sur les réseaux sociaux. « Nous ne perdrons pas davantage de femmes et d'enfants victimes de personnes tordues qui ne devraient même pas être en Irlande. Nous sommes en guerre » a-t-il affirmé sur X (anciennement Twitter). La police a dénoncé des agitateurs « d'extrême droite ».

Ces émeutes témoignent de manière spectaculaire de la montée d'un sentiment anti-migrants en Irlande. Les tensions sont alimentées par une pression migratoire conjuguée à une pénurie de logements. L'arrivée de migrants venus de Libye et de Syrie, puis d'Ukrainiens fuyant la guerre, a exacerbé ces problèmes sociaux. Dans ce pays de 5,3 millions d'habitants, près de 100.000 réfugiés sont arrivés d'Ukraine, soit l'une des proportions les plus élevées de l'UE par rapport à la population. Le nombre de demandeurs d'asile a augmenté de façon spectaculaire ces dernières années, saturant le système. Selon des chiffres officiels, les demandes d'asile ont été multipliées par plus de cinq en 2022 par rapport à 2021.

Ces derniers mois, des hôtels abritant des demandeurs d'asile ont été assiégés et des campements de tentes brûlés. En mai, la police recensait déjà 127 manifestations « anti-immigration » depuis le début de l'année.