A Noah’s ark of wild animals
The
earliest reported patient infected with what was later named COVID-19 was found
in Hubei on November 17.
By CAMERON STEWART and WILL GLASGOW
- From Inquirer
May 9, 2020
- 4 MINUTE READ
This
is the third part of our investigation by Cameron Stewart and Will Glasgow on
China and the coronavirus. Read part one and part two here.
The earliest reported patient
infected with what was later named COVID-19 was found in Hubei on November 17,
according to a report in the South China Morning Post, the masthead owned by
China’s richest man, Jack Ma, the Alibaba billionaire who is perhaps the
Communist Party’s most famous member after Xi.
That was more than nine weeks before
Wuhan, a city with a population of 11 million people, was put into lockdown on
January 23. It was the biggest quarantine in history, until the next day when
almost all of Hubei province, with its population of almost 60 million, was cut
off from China and the rest of the world. It was a dramatic example of the
power of China’s centralised political system. But did it come too late?
Identifying a new virus is always
going to be a challenge for the first hospital system that encounters it.
Doctors and disease experts in Wuhan, however, were aware that the public comments
by local officials did not match their experience. Far more patients were
arriving in their hospitals with symptoms of the new illness than was being
disclosed. Many regret not speaking out after Li and the seven other “rumour
spreaders” were punished. “We should have taken the risk,” Li Yunhua, a
radiologist at the Hubei Xinhua Hospital in Wuhan, told Caixin, a Chinese media
outfit with a well-deserved reputation for delicately treading around the
instructions of the Central Propaganda Department.
These health workers were operating
within a system that valued “political stability” over their professionalism.
That much was put in writing in June 2018, as hospitals were moved under the
control of their Chinese Communist Party secretary.
The new arrangement, announced by
Xinhua, was required “to thoroughly implement Xi Jinping’s socialist thought
with Chinese characteristics in the new era”. It was to “give full play to the
leading role of the party committee of public hospitals”.
Less than two years later, what
looked like an arcane internal matter overseen by China’s secretive governing
party has changed the world. In part, it explains why Ai was reprimanded for
looking into the new infectious disease. She had not taken appropriate
“political” consideration. It is an arrangement that China’s government likely
does not want an independent review to have a close look at.
The same goes for the guiding role
of Wuhan’s government on its hospital system, which obediently reported very
few cases of the highly infectious new disease between January 5 and January
16, a period leading up to and including the province’s two most important
annual political meetings.
The relationship between the
provincial and municipal governments and the powerful centre is another point
of discomfort. In an interview on state media on January 27, days into Wuhan’s
extraordinary lockdown which ultimately ran for more than two months, the
city’s mayor, Zhou Xianwang, said China’s centralised political system did not
allow him to reveal the true situation. “As a local government, we need to get
authorisation before disclosure,” he said in an interview broadcast on China
Central Television.
Then there are the destroyed samples
of the virus. Caixin reported that on January 3, China’s National Health
Commission, the country’s top health authority, ordered institutions in Wuhan
not to publish any information related to the unknown disease and to destroy
samples of the disease. The report apparently so upset the government that it
was removed from Caixin’s website.
Some in Washington, including Pompeo
and Donald Trump’s Mandarin-speaking Deputy National Security Adviser, Matt
Pottinger, are increasingly keen to snoop around Wuhan’s virology labs. But the
more orthodox interest remains in the world’s most famous “seafood” market,
which also traded a Noah’s ark of wild animals, including snakes, hares,
pheasants, giant salamanders and crocodiles. While the sale of many of those
wild animals is officially banned, vendors told Caixin the trade has continued
untroubled in the market’s western corner for the past decade.
‘How can we
resolve the case without evidence? Tracing the pathogen is a complicated
process’
But even if an investigation team
were given access, it is not clear what they could learn. On the day before Ai
was told off, a clean-up squad was sent in to disinfect and shutter the place —
evidence the Chinese system was taking the situation seriously, in its idiosyncratic
way. It has hugely undermined the effort to establish how the virus emerged.
“The market was closed, cleaned up,
and the crime scene was gone,” said Guan Yi, director of the State Key
Laboratory of Emerging Infectious Disease at the University of Hong Kong.
“How can we resolve the case without
evidence? Tracing the pathogen is a complicated process. We can’t just find an
infected animal and determine that was the origin.”
After being delayed more than two
weeks, the WHO’s joint mission on COVID-19 was finally allowed entry into
China in mid-February. The mission was led by Bruce Aylward, a Canadian
epidemiologist, who in a notorious television interview in March refused to
answer a question about Taiwan, apparently concerned about how Beijing would respond.
Only “select members” of the 25
visiting experts were allowed to go to Wuhan for the final two days of their
eight-day site visit. The published itinerary shows they were kept away from
the market.
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