Berlin ’s smug and obtuse insistence on
the superiority of empirical “facts” makes it inevitable that he should cite
and quote Joseph Schumpeter, perhaps the most sophisticated proponent of
empiricism in social science, in the very last paragraph of his influential
essay on “the two conceptions of liberty”:
Indeed, the very desire for guarantees that our values are eternal and
secure in some objective heaven is perhaps only a craving for the certainties
of childhood or the absolute values of our primitive past. 'To realise the
relative validity of one's convictions', said an admirable writer of our time,
'and yet stand for them unflinchingly is what distinguishes a civilised man from
a barbarian.’ [J. Schumpeter, CS&D, p.243] To demand more than this is
perhaps a deep and incurable metaphysical
need; but to allow it to determine one's practice is a symptom of an
equally deep, and more dangerous, moral and political immaturity. (Berlin , op.cit., p.32)
Evidently, Berlin
and Schumpeter are relying on the truth-fulness
of empiricism, on its “realism” as against the “metaphysical need” of
rationalism, that is, against its presumed intransigence and recalcitrance,
according to Berlin ,
in the face of “facts”. Schumpeter begins Chapter Two of his Theorie
with this sweeping and suggestive summation:
“The social process
which rationalizes our life and thought has led us away from the metaphysical
treatment of social development and taught us to see the possibility of an
empirical treatment; but it has done its work so imperfectly that we must be
careful in dealing with the phenomenon itself, still more with the concept with
which we comprehend it, and most of all with the word by which we designate the
concept and whose associations may lead us astray in all manner of directions.
Closely connected with the metaphysical preconception…. is every search for a
‘meaning’ of history. The same is true of the postulate that a nation, a
civilization, or even the whole of mankind must show some kind of uniform
unilinear development, as even such a matter-of-fact mind as Roscher assumed…”
(p.57)
The footnote at
“rationalizes” was expanded for the English translation and reads as follows:
“This is used in Max
Weber’s sense. As the reader will see, “rational” and “empirical” here mean, if
not identical, yet cognate, things. They are equally different from, and
opposed to, “metaphysical”, which implies going beyond the reach of both
“reason” and “facts”, beyond the realm, that is, of science. With some it has
become a habit to use the word “rational” in much the same sense as we do
“metaphysical”. Hence some warning against misunderstanding may not be out of
place.”
Evident here is the
maladroit manner and dis-comfort (not aided, and perhaps exacerbated, by the
disjoint prose) with which Schumpeter approaches the question of the “meaning”
of history. The Rationalisierung,
which Schumpeter adopts from Weber, has made “possible” a scientific “empirical
treatment” of “social development (Entwicklung)”,
but has done so only “imperfectly”, not to such a degree that we are able to
free ourselves entirely of “metaphysical” concepts – which is why “we must be
careful in dealing with the phenomenon [of Entwicklung]
itself”. Nevertheless, Schumpeter believes that it is possible to leave
“metaphysics” behind and to focus on “both ‘reason’ and ‘facts’”, and therefore
on the “realm of science”. In true Machian empiricist fashion, Schumpeter
completely fails to see the point that Weber was making in adopting the ante litteram Nietzschean conception of
Rationalisierung to which he gave the name. “The social process which
rationalizes” is an exquisitely Weberian expression: far from indicating that
there is a “rational science” founded on “reason” and “facts” that can
epistemologically and uncritically be opposed to a non-scientifc idealistic and
“metaphysical rationalism”, Weber is saying what Nietzsche intended by the
ex-ertion of the Will to Power as an ontological dimension of life and the
world that “imposes” the “rationalization” of social processes and development
in such a manner that they can be subjected to mathesis, to “scientific
control”! What Weber posits as a “practice”, one that has clear Nietzschean
onto-logical (philosophical) and onto-genetic (biological) origins, Schumpeter
mistakes for an “empirical” and “objective” process that is “rational” and
“factual” at once – forgetting thus the very basis of Nietzsche’s critique of
Roscher and “historicism”, - certainly not (!) because they are founded on
“metaphysics” (!), but because they fail to “question critically” the necessarily meta-physical foundations of their “value-systems”, of their
“historical truth” or “meaning”!
Far from positing a
“scientific-rational”, “ob-jective” and “empirical” methodology from which
Roscher and the German Historical School have “diverged” with their
philo-Hegelian “rationalist teleology”, Weber and Nietzsche before him were
attacking the foundations of any “scientific” study of “the social process” or
“social development” that does not see it for what it is – Rationalisierung, that is, “rationalization of life and the world”,
the ex-pression and mani-festation of the Wille
zur Macht! By contrast, Schumpeter believes that the mere abandonment of
any “linearity” in the interpretation of history, of any “progressus” (as
Nietzsche calls it), is sufficient to “free” his “rational science” from the
pitfalls of “metaphysics”!
Berlin considers and
acknowledges the limitations of the liberal worldview when human needs other
than those that have to do with claims on social resources are considered –
such as the need for full participation in the conduct of social affairs:
This is the
degradation that I am fighting against - I am not seeking equality of legal
rights, nor liberty to do as I wish (although I may want these too), but a
condition in which I can feel that I am, because I am taken to be, a responsible
agent, whose will is taken into consideration because I am entitled to it, even
if I am attacked and persecuted for being what I am or choosing as I do. [22]….
All this has
little to do with Mill's notion of liberty as limited only by the danger of
doing harm to others. It is the non-recognition of this psychological and
political fact (which lurks behind the apparent ambiguity of the term
'liberty') that has, perhaps, blinded some contemporary liberals to the world
in which they live. Their plea is clear, their cause is just. But they do not
allow for the variety of basic human needs. (Berlin , op.cit., p.26)
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