Saturday 2 May 2020
Civil Society and the State - Part 4 of "THE STATE AND ECONOMIC THEORY"
Neither for Aristotle nor for Marsilius or
Bodin – the first theoreticians after Aristotle to inquire on the nature of the
State (Machiavelli clearly did not) until Hobbes - can the State change either
the “natural” or the divinely-decreed way in which a community reproduces
itself. But whereas for Antiquity the centrality of the household conditions
the ethical role of the State and thus allows the active participation of its
citizens in government, already with the political thought of the Middle Ages
the focus shifts to the preservation of social
peace in a historical context in which the household has been replaced by
the feud. Marsilius and Bodin reflect on a society in which the partition of
land by large aristocratic landowners is likely to degenerate into civil war
without the State’s correction of
corruptible human nature, not as in Antiquity as the forum or ecclesia for the per-fection of the ethical life of its citizens
but rather as the bridge or com-pletion of
the gap in social reproduction left by the antagonistic interests of households
that preserves or conserves social peace
by means of absolutist government – and the only question becomes one of governance.
Though Bodin can conceive of a societas naturalis existing
independently of the State, the possibility of civil war and its descent into a
state of nature makes the existence of the State part of the divine natural
order (as in the family governed by the paterfamilias
– cf. Filmer’s Patriarcha) so that
obedience to the sovereign must be absolute.
Here it is the Ratio, the animal
rationale, that dictates absolute rule, and the Ratio is first derived from
and ascribed to the Divinity and then manifested in Nature. The
The difference between Aristotle’s per-fection and Bodin’s correction (cf. Constant’s “freedom” and
“liberties”) will later become Hegel’s correct formulation of the question of
the State – that it must answer to the ful-filment of human beings and not
simply ensure their protection as defensor
pacis (where societas naturalis
is possible) or creator pacis (a restauratio ab imis fundamentis, where
the state of nature, either original [Hobbes] or degenerate [Rousseau], is
corrected by the status civilis to
found the societas civilis ). In
modern political theory the sphere of social life to which belong all social
relations independent of the State is known as “civil society” (cf. A.
Ferguson, An Essay on Civil Society on
which Adam Smith relied for his “civilised society”), and the State is
theorised as the institution that complements civil society by “com-pleting” or
by “preserving” or “conserving” it – by supplying the “order” or “law” or
“administration” without which civil society would not be able to govern itself
not in an “economic” sense but rather in a “political” sense given that the
Political, in marked contrast to the Economy, is the sphere of public opinion
and therefore of unquantifiable and often irrational beliefs. For those
political theories that see civil society as a self-sustaining sphere for which
the State provides merely a “guarantee” of social peace (Locke, Constant), the
State is seen as a “defensor pacis”
in that it merely “defends” a social peace that is inherited either from divine
sources (Marsilius, Bodin), or from “natural rights” (Pufendorf, Grotius and
Locke). For those theories instead for which the State provides the very legal
and political foundation indispensable for the establishment of civil society
(Hobbes, Spinoza, Rousseau), the State is seen as a “creator pacis” – a veritable “deus
mortalis”, (cf. C. Schmitt, The
Leviathan); it is the mechanical resultant of the natural physical conflict
between atomistic individuals in the state of nature (status naturae) that precedes the civil state (status civilis, cf. Hobbes and the negatives Denken from Schopenhauer to Nietzsche and the Austrian
School).
The basic building blocks of the State for
classical political theory from Aristotle onwards are almost exclusively ontogenetic, in the sense that the State
is seen as the political pro-duct or construct of more basic elements such as the individual, the family
household, the group or tribe or village (oikos,
vicus), the city (polis, civitas),
and finally “the people” or nation – hence, the nation-State. Even in those
political theories that identify the State immediately with society or civilisation
as societas civilis as against a pre-statal
societas naturalis, the “statality”
of human being is never considered. There is never a suggestion that the State
may actually be a necessary precondition of human being, of being human in a phylogenetic sense, in the Marxian sense
of “species-conscious being” (Gattungs-wesen)
or that the State is an essential element in the metabolic productive capacity
of a society. The State is thought to be fundamental to the establishment of
the societas civilis not because of
the phylogenetic attributes of human being but rather merely to prevent the degeneration and descent
of natural society into civil war (Locke) or else to exit a hypothetical or primordial state of civil war (Hobbes).
Nor does classical political theory even
envisage the contrasting possibility that the State may “contain” - in the
sense of limiting, hampering or even stifling - the productive forces of civil
society except as an aberration and degeneration of the “true” political role
and goal of the State. Even in the negatives
Denken (Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Weber and the Austrian
School), where the role of the State is the “negative” one of creating or maintaining
the salus publica (social peace), and
even in its liberal counterpart (Locke, Constant, Maine, Bastiat), the State is
not seen as the source of social conflict but merely as the necessary guarantor
of social peace. Only when the State deviates from its scientifically required
neutrality from civil society does it interfere with its productive, and
specifically its economic, potential. An even more negative view of the State
is adopted by Marx and Schumpeter for whom the State actively stifles the creative
productive potential of civil society.
To the extent that the reproduction of social
units is identical with the broadly “political” aspects of social life, as societas civilis or civitas or polis, then it
is indistinguishable from the status
civilis that follows the exit of humanity from the state of nature into the
State itself. But to the extent that this status
civilis begins to be differentiated from the reproduction of independent
social units that may or may not coalesce into a State, then the State is distinct
from this preceding civil society. This tendency to draw a clear distinction
between social interaction or social relations, on one side, and social
reproduction or social relations of
production, on the other side, only becomes prominent once the notion of
“labour” intended as “individual labour” as a separate source of social wealth
is isolated from other forms of social interaction, from Hobbes and Locke until
the definitive culmination of this social theory in Hegel and Marx. With Hobbes
and Locke, for the first time in human history the notion of a societas naturalis is separated from
that of a societas civilis or the
State in that the possibility is canvassed of a status naturae in which relations between individuals are possible
although unstable either in a state of civil war or in one that can degenerate
into one. By contrast, in all political theory prior to Hobbes and Locke only
the possibility of stasis or civil war, the bellum
omnium contra omnes, could be countenanced, but never that of a state of
nature historically prior to or
analytically distinct from the status
civilis or the societas civilis.
Hobbes allows only of a status civilis that is founded by the State by institution and not
by acquisition because his status naturae
allows of no possible societas naturalis
independent of the State. This exposes Hobbes to the objection that his State,
a deus mortalis that creates social
peace, is incapable of explaining how this status
civilis came about – for if human beings are capable of a contractum unionis it is not clear why
this should become mechanically a
contractum subjectionis. Hobbes’s State is homologous to the Walrasian
state of equilibrium in that it is entirely mechanical and static and allows
for no historical metabole or development.
It is thus that “civil society” as the
repository of all economic as against
merely socio-political or ethico-legal relations is neatly isolated from the
State as the political pro-duct and mere legal guarantor, not the creator or
founder of civil society either in its ethical (family, tribe, social values
and goals) or strictly economical aspects (market exchange, production). Because
for the negatives Denken, as the true
theoretical matrix of liberal bourgeois politico-economic theory, the proper
function of the State is to ensure the untrammeled operation of the “self-regulating
market” and the “laws” of competition (“the level playing field”), any
interference by the State with these “laws” through the imposition of
extraneous “political” or “ethical” goals is denounced as improper in that it
transgresses against individual rights, or even as unscientific in the sense
that it distorts the quasi-mechanical “economic” choices on the part of
individuals.
Even for socialist economic theory, in which
it plays obviously a central role, the State intervenes only to plan and to
co-ordinate individual economic choices in the interests of society as a whole
so as to spare it from the deleterious effects of capitalist “anarchy” in which
short-term self-interests are placed before long-run economic and social
welfare. In other words, for socialism, and even for Marx, “the economy” and
“social reproduction” are still realities separate
from the State on which the State can intervene only in an ethico-political or
“super-structural” capacity (liberalism) or in a scientific capacity (socialism
and Marx’s dictatorship of the proletariat) correcting the anarchy of
individual actions so as to maximise the public good or social welfare (cf.
Pigou, Lerner, Dobb), but not in a fundamental manner as an essential part of
those “social relations of production”.
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