We wish to reward our loyal friends visiting this Blog with the first part of Chapter Four of our book on Max Weber - the Weberbuch - on the opposition of the concepts of Liberalism and Democracy. Enjoy!
One hundred years before Max Weber “crystallised” the
entire Romantic opposition to the
ravages of capitalist industry, of its “iron cage”, of its “soul-less bureaucratisation”
and “dis-enchanted” Rationalisierung
of all aspects of social life; one hundred years before Weber had finally isolated and identified the source of
this otherwise inexplicable socio-political and politico-economic development in the Vorbermerkungen as the “exact
calculation” enabled by the constitution of “rational organisation of free
labor under the regular [calculable] discipline of the [capitalist] factory”, Benjamin
Constant, one of the greatest exponents of the European Liberalism that emerged
triumphant out of the upheaval of the Age of Revolution, summarised what he
perceived to be the great transformation
of human society from Antiquity to Modernity as follows:
Cette différence en amène une autre. La
guerre est antérieure au commerce; car la guerre et le commerce ne sont que
deux moyens différents d'atteindre le même but, celui de posséder ce que l'on
désire. Le commerce n'est qu'un hommage
rendu à la force du possesseur par l'aspirant à la possession. C'est une tentative pour obtenir de gré à
gré ce qu'on n'espère plus conquérir par la violence. Un homme qui serait
toujours le plus fort n'aurait jamais l'idée du commerce. C'est l'expérience
qui, en lui prouvant que la guerre, c'est-a-dire, l'emploi de sa force contre
la force d'autrui, l'expose à diverses résistances et à divers échecs, le porte
à recourir au commerce, c'est-à-dire, à un moyen plus doux et plus sûr
d'engager l'intérêt d'un autre à consentir à ce qui convient à son intérêt. La guerre est l'impulsion, le commerce est
le calcul. Mais par la’ même il doit venir une époque où le commerce
remplace la guerre. Nous sommes arrivés a cette époque.
Utterly
evident is the Hobbesian derivation of
Constant’s hypothesis, which however he does not seem to appreciate in its explicit and dramatic implications. If,
indeed, “commerce has replaced war” as the ex-pression of human
individualist antagonism, of human conflict in the state of nature or of the
degeneration of civil society into civil war (remember von Klausewitz, “War is
the continuation of politics by other means”), Constant is unable to explain
how and why this switch, how and why
this quasi-religious conversion has
taken place historically and indeed how and why this “commerce” can take
place at all (!) beyond the mere statement that “le commerce n'est qu'un hommage rendu à la force du possesseur par
l'aspirant à la possession; c'est une tentative pour obtenir de gré à gré ce
qu'on n'espère plus conquérir par la violence”. Had Constant read Hobbes
more carefully, or had he lived long enough to read Nietzsche, he would have
realised that commerce can replace war as a manifestation of human conflict
whilst
still providing the basis of the social synthesis, only if commerce or exchange involve not the exchange of mere
“possessions”(however “gradual”) but rather that of dead labor (Constant’s “possessions”) with living labor – that is to say, only if this
“exchange” is categorically incommensurable in that it involves the reduction
of human living labor to mere dead objectified labor so that the former may be commanded politically by means of the latter! - And that such
“exchange” can take place if and only if living labor is “separated” from the
means of its reproduction and of production. It is only if living labor is
politically and violently reduced to dead objectified labor that its pro-duct
can be “calculated” or “measured” under “the regular discipline of the
factory”.
As we
explained in Part Two, contrary to Marx’s own account of this “reduction” (or
“fetishism” as he styles it), there is absolutely no way in which this can
occur by means of “market forces” or a “market mechanism” that operates automatically! There is no way
therefore, contrary to Marxian theory and orthodoxy, how a capitalist society
can function without the wilful and conscious
action of specific political institutions (whose operation and function we
will describe in this Part). Our task in this Part is not to describe how capitalist society is politically
regulated but simply to show that it must
be so regulated if it is to function at all!
Similarly
Weber, in reprising a century later “the brilliant Constant hypothesis” with
its functionalist and organicist ideal
type of “the ancient State”, as he himself acknowledges in ‘Objektivitat’, is entirely silent about
the real historical and theoretical
foundations of this exakte Kalkulation
that he too places at the centre of capitalist society and industry:
The constructs of the natural law and the organic theories of the state have
exactly the same function and, to recall an
ideal type in our sense, so does
Benjamin Constant's theory of the ancient state. It serves as a harbor
until one has learned to navigate
safely in the vast sea of empirical
facts. The coming of age of science in
fact always implies the transcendence
of the ideal-type, insofar as it was
thought of as possessing
empirical validity or as a class
concept (Gattungsbegriff) . However,
it is still legitimate today to use the brilliant Constant
hypothesis to
demonstrate certain aspects and historically unique features
of ancient
political life, as long as one carefully bears in mind its
ideal-typical
character.
(p.104, MoSS)
In effect, Weber adopts much more than what he, following
Simmel’s neo-Kantian theory of “social forms”, styles as merely Constant’s “ideal-type”
analysis of “ancient political life”: by exploiting the contrast that Constant so ably draws between the State in Antiquity
and “the modern State”, Weber effectively assimilates and elaborates the
Frenchman’s “brilliant hypothesis” to erect upon it his entire analysis of
capitalism and theory of society as well! In doing so, however, Weber does more
than jettison, with Nietzsche, the “jusnaturalist and organicist” delusions
that abounded from Hobbes to Durkheim: Weber also wholly eludes and elides and
even obfuscates Constant’s genial distinction between the importance of
“political freedom” (liberte’) for
the citizens of Antiquity and the functional retreat from this “public happiness” (jouissance publique) occasioned by the spread of “commerce and
circulation of property” under the novel capitalist regime, in favour of
“private happiness” (jouissance privee),
of the pursuit of private wealth and luxury.
The
reason for this apparent “omission” is that Weber’s rigorous intellectual
training, and in particular his thorough grounding in and assimilation of the negatives Denken of Schopenhauer and
Nietzsche, prevent him from
com-prehending the fundamental dif-ference
(the different practical effect) of what appears to Weber as an innocuous and vapid,
“romantic” distinction between that “public
happiness”, that political “freedom” that had been so precious to the
artificers of the American and French Revolutions, and the mere “private
happiness”, the petty and restricted “liberties” – what Constant calls “garanties” – to which the rise of the
bourgeoisie and its “commerce”, or the rule of capital, have dramatically reduced and confined human political
freedom.
Constant continues,
Il
résulte de ce que je viens d'exposer, que nous ne pouvons plus jouir de la liberté des anciens, qui se composait
de la participation active et constante au pouvoir collectif. Notre liberté à
nous, doit se composer de la jouissance
paisible de l'indépendance privée. La
part que dans l'antiquité chacun prenait à la souveraineté nationale n'était
point, comme de nos jours, une supposition abstraite. La volonté de chacun
avait une influence réelle: l'exercice de cette volonté était un plaisir vif et
répété. En conséquence, les anciens étaient disposés à faire beaucoup de sacrifices
pour la conservation de leurs droits politiques et de leur part dans
l'administration de l'État. Chacun sentant avec orgueil tout ce que valait son
suffrage, trouvait dans cette conscience de son importance personnelle, un
ample dédommagement.
With Classics and Neoclassics, the sphere of “happiness”
or “utility” (for the Classics “labor” has utility because it “creates value”
positively, whereas for Neoclassics it “consumes” the world so that “utility”
or “value” consists in the “saving of
labor” instead, which therefore has “dis-utility”)
is always “private” because “labor” can be “divided” into “individual labors”
and can thereby be alienated in exchange
for dead objectified labor, so that the whole point of the “sociality” of social labor, its phylogenetic
interdependence, is lost. This is the root cause for the fact that
nous
ne pouvons plus jouir de la liberté des anciens, qui se composait de la participation active et constante au pouvoir
collectif.
Under the rule of capital with its Trennung or enforced separation of living labor from means of
production, and its parcelisation of social
labor into “individual labors”, the
private sphere, civil society or the status
civilis, is what must be protected from
the State, which was constituted for
this purpose by political convention specifically
as a way of preventing or escaping from the state of nature or status
naturae and its concomitant scientific
hypothesis as being the domain of necessity.
Already, therefore, the “everyday life” of “citizens” is subjected to the “sovereignty” of the constituted powers and cannot itself act as a constituent power. The original contractum
unionis, by virtue of the fact that it always understood the subjects of
this “union” to be individuals in
opposition to one another under the dire necessity (Hobbes) or the simple
“necessity” (negatives Denken) that
leads to the alienation of individual political “freedom” to a Sovereign who
will “pre-vent civil war” and assure “public safety”– by virtue of this fact,
the con-vention of the contractum unionis between “individuals”
was bound to degenerate into a contractum
subjectionis of these “individuals” by the Sovereign or State. Put differently, because in this status civilis, in this “State”, the
individuals composing civil society have necessarily
alienated the “freedom” they
enjoyed in the state of nature, now this “freedom” is reduced to and even confused
with “liberty”, that is to say, with the “protection” of their
“possessions” and the preservation of the salus
publica (public safety).
This is the
essence of liberalism. Norberto Bobbio is entirely right, therefore, to insist
on the incompatibility of liberalism and democracy (which is his central thesis
in Liberalismo e Democrazia). This is what Constant, and Weber who
copies his analytical blueprint, both fail to grasp. Constant mistakes for a
“technical” fact – the difficulty and complexity of “modern life” – what is
indeed the reality of the dis-enfranchisement
of the entire class of workers from ownership and decision-making in
capitalist society under the rule of the bourgeoisie.
Ce
dédommagement n'existe plus aujourd'hui pour nous. Perdu dans la multitude, l'individu n'aperçoit presque jamais
l'influence qu'il exerce. Jamais sa volonté ne s'empreint sur l'ensemble,
rien ne constate à ses propres yeux sa coopération. L'exercice des droits
politiques ne nous offre donc plus qu'une partie des jouissances que les
anciens y trouvaient, et en même temps les progrès de la civilisation, la
tendance commerciale de l'époque, la communication des peuples entre eux, ont
multiplié et varié à l'infini les moyens de bonheur particulier.
Whether it be under Hobbes’s “Leviathan” or
State-machine, or else under Locke’s consensual “common-wealth”, what the State
protects are the “possessions” of “self-interested
individuals” – life, liberty and estate – to which they had either a “natural
right” (Locke) or a de facto claim
(Hobbes) already in the state of
nature but which were then under constant threat from mutual aggression. There
is no notion of “public happiness” in this political theory because “happiness”
or “utility” or “pleasure” is limited to the sphere of “individual
possessions”, which includes the power “to possess and alienate” human living
labor as if it were a mere “object”, as
if it were mere dead objectified
labor – in such a way that the “pro-ducer” (the worker) is homologated with and mistaken for the
object, the pro-duct of the work! Indeed,
the social, political and economic reality that underpins the concomitant social
theory of liberalism is that this
“private happiness” made up of the ownership of private property is entirely
dependent on the “separation” (Trennung)
of living labor from its means of production, its “parcelisation” from social
labor into “separate individual labors”, and its violent “exchange”and
therefore homogenisation with dead
labor (Constant’s “possessions”). This and this alone is the basis of the
capitalist social synthesis: unable
to comprehend the real character of the capitalist transformation, Constant can
only lament the loss of political “totality” (l’ensemble) by the
individual will (volonte’).
The problem arises, as Constant and later even de Tocqueville
perceived, when this “protection” comes to permeate every aspect of the
“private sphere” through the process of what Constant calls “commerce” and
Weber describes more aptly as “socialisation”, that is, the development of
social capital. Both Constant and Weber, following the classic lines of
liberalist doctrine, mistake the effect for the cause: - they believe that the Parlamentarisierung is the “result” of a
“natural progression” to the Demokratisierung, dictated by “the system of needs and
wants”, by “the state of nature”, by the “freedom of the will” occasioning “the iron cage”, from the political model
of Antiquity to that of “modern capitalism”, rather than being the
“instrumental political expression” of capitalist relations of production.
Car, de ce que la liberté
moderne diffère de la liberté antique, il s'ensuit qu'elle est aussi menacée
d'un danger d'espèce différente.
Le danger de la liberté antique était qu'attentifs uniquement à s'assurer le partage du pouvoir social, les hommes ne fissent trop bon marché des droits et des jouissances individuelles.
Le danger de la liberté moderne, c'est qu'absorbés dans la jouissance de notre indépendance privée, et dans la poursuite de nos intérêts particuliers, nous ne renoncions trop facilement à notre droit de partage dans le pouvoir politique.
Le danger de la liberté antique était qu'attentifs uniquement à s'assurer le partage du pouvoir social, les hommes ne fissent trop bon marché des droits et des jouissances individuelles.
Le danger de la liberté moderne, c'est qu'absorbés dans la jouissance de notre indépendance privée, et dans la poursuite de nos intérêts particuliers, nous ne renoncions trop facilement à notre droit de partage dans le pouvoir politique.
Il
s'ensuit que nous devons être bien plus attachés que les anciens à notre
indépendance individuelle; car les anciens, lorsqu'ils sacrifiaient cette
indépendance aux droits politiques, sacrifiaient moins pour obtenir plus;
tandis qu'en faisant le même sacrifice, nous donnerions plus pour obtenir
moins.
Le but des anciens était le partage du pouvoir social entre tous les citoyens d'une même patrie: c'était là ce qu'ils nommaient liberté. Le but des modernes est la sécurité dans les jouissances privées; et ils nomment liberté les garanties accordées par les institutions à ces jouissances….
Le but des anciens était le partage du pouvoir social entre tous les citoyens d'une même patrie: c'était là ce qu'ils nommaient liberté. Le but des modernes est la sécurité dans les jouissances privées; et ils nomment liberté les garanties accordées par les institutions à ces jouissances….
In the uni-versal
Eris of the newly-constituted liberal
bourgeois society, the overriding function of the State (les institutions) can be one and one only: to grant (accorder) “security” to its component “self-interested individuals”
against the rapacity of one another that threatens always to widen into the
“war of all against all”! The
essential apory in Constant’s and Weber’s “formulation” of this problem – of
how “conflicting self-interests” in their “freedom” can ever “converge” so as
to found a “rationality”, whether economic or still less “political”, or else
of how these self-interests can “diverge” and
still found a sphere of “necessity” or “scarcity”! – is that this
Schopenhauerian and Hobbesian “universal Eris” cannot resolve these conundrums
of political “freedom” and of economic “necessity” except by sublating and
reducing the former to the latter (determinism) or by hypostatising the former
by postulating its “autonomy”. By contrast, Nietzsche understood all too well
that Schopenhauer’s postulate of this universal
Eris (in Book IV of Die Welt) was
“powerless” (ohnmachtig) to confront
Hegel’s problematic of the social
synthesis - of the actual existence of society, of human
com-unitas, of co-operation and even of inter esse! That is why he gave the
problem of the Rationalisierung a
“solution” that we have explored in the Nietzschebuch.
And this “solution” involves the definition of “parliamentary democracy”, of
Weber’s presumed reconciliation of Demokratisierung with Parlamentarisierung, as an oxymoron, a contradictio in adjecto. So important,
so “apocalyptic”, so “fundamental”, is this Nietzschean pitiless critique of the presumed liberal homologation and osmosis of the Political
with the Economic in both its Hegelian and Liberal forms, that Weber would
surely have made it explicit in his
work had he truly understood it rather than simply “pass it by” (allusion to
‘On Passing-By’ in Zarathustra).
Instead, Weber follows faithfully the lead proffered by the
“liberal” Constant, but with an essential difference: for Constant, the State
represents both a mechanical or organic
as well as automatic re-presentation
of the individual self-interests of its subjects. In this sense, the
“representative system” of bourgeois capitalist society is not only possible as a means of re-presenting the
possessive individualist interests of its subjects without interference by the State in the “private sphere” of
“commerce”, but it is also necessary
to ensure that this State-machine is
not used by those “representatives” to interfere with the market mechanism. In
other words, Constant believes not only that it is possible to separate the Political from the Economic, but that
indeed it is necessary to do so to
ensure the correct functioning of the
market mechanism and that, indeed, this functioning itself is a powerful corrective to any dysfunctional
“interference” against it by the Political. Whereas earlier it was the complexity
of “socialisation”, of “commerce”, that narrowed the individual’s focus
from the political “totality” of “public freedom” to his “private possessions”,
now it is also this complexity of commerce that narrows the political power of
the State over the private sphere of its individual members.
Que le pouvoir s'y résigne
donc; il nous faut de la liberté,
et nous l'aurons; mais comme la liberté qu'il nous faut est différente de celle
des anciens, il faut à cette liberté une autre organisation que celle qui
pourrait convenir a la liberté antique; dans celle-ci, plus l'homme consacrait
de temps et de force a l'exercice de ses droits politiques, plus il se croyait
libre; dans l'espèce de liberté dont nous sommes susceptibles, plus l'exercice
de nos droits politiques nous laissera de temps pour nos intérêts privés, plus
la liberté nous sera précieuse.
De la vient, Messieurs, la nécessité du système
représentatif. Le système représentatif n'est autre chose qu'une
organisation à l'aide de laquelle une nation se décharge sur quelques individus
de ce qu'elle ne peut ou ne veut pas faire elle-même. Les individus pauvres
font eux-mêmes leurs affaires: les hommes riches prennent des intendants. C'est
l'histoire des nations anciennes et des nations modernes. Le système
représentatif est une procuration donnée à un certain nombre d'hommes par la
masse du peuple, qui veut que ses intérêts soient défendus, et qui néanmoins
n'a pas le temps de les défendre toujours lui-même. Mais a moins d'être
insensés, les hommes riches qui ont des intendants examinent avec attention et
sévérité si ces intendants font leur devoir, s'ils ne sont ni négligents ni
corruptibles, ni incapables; et pour juger de la gestion de ces mandataires,
les commettants qui ont de la prudence se mettent bien au fait des affaires
dont ils leur confient l'administration. De même, les peuples qui, dans le but
de jouir de la liberté qui leur convient, recourent au système représentatif,
doivent exercer une surveillance active et constante sur leur représentants, et
se réserver, à des époques qui ne soient pas séparées par de trop longs
intervalles, le droit de les écarter s'ils ont trompé leurs voeux, et de
révoquer les pouvoirs dont ils auraient abusé.
For both Constant and Weber, then, the “trans-formation”
of the experience of “freedom” from that of “active participation” in the
affairs of State in Antiquity to that of “passive protection” under the State, of bourgeois Sekuritat and salus publica in “modern capitalism”, is related functionally and organically to the progress and evolution of the “system of
needs and wants”, of the “iron cage of
modern industrial labor” (Weber). But whereas for Constant the spheres of
Politics and Economics remain clearly separate, and indeed must remain so for
the correct functioning of the “representative system”, for Weber this “automatic”
separation, far from being “necessary”, is simply im-possible. This helps explain why in Weber there is concern for the
State and parliamentary democracy only to the extent that they are functional and organic to “the rational
organisation of free labor” and ultimately to “the iron cage”. Both the ascetic
ideal and the iron cage provide the “irrational foundations” on which the
“purposive rationality” (Zweck-rationalitat)
of the Political, of the State, is erected. But the State cannot found or guarantee the “normative
rationality” (Wert-rationalitat) of
the Economic.
Weber sees the “freedom” of “labor” only as “autonomous
market demand” and not in broader “political” terms in an ethical or
teleological sense. He understands “the iron cage of modern industrial labor” –
the Economic - to be naturaliter the
necessary condition of the Political, as it was for Hobbes, in that “civil
society” now is identical with the
State because the entire “task”, legality and legitimacy, of the State is
precisely this “guarantee” (cf. Benjamin Constant, Reflexions sur les Constitutions et les Guaranties) of the market
mechanism as the necessitas (either
“dire” or not, given that for Weber the will is not identical with Hobbesian liberum arbitrium and there ec-sists a
“technical rationality”), the scientific hypothesis of the equi-librium of self-interests of
atomised individuals whose only aim in social life, in exiting the state of
nature, is the pursuit of “private happiness” or “utility”. The Political
becomes absorbed into the Economic;
the State is for Weber, as it was for Hobbes, a mere instrument, a State-machine;
but unlike Hobbes’s Leviathan, which was a product of Galilean and Newtonian
rationalism, it is incapable of providing
an “ultimate guarantee” of rationality to human civil society, - certainly
not as it does in the Hegelian Vergeistigung
of the Absolute Spirit so thoroughly dismantled by Nietzsche or in the
“self-regulating” Smithian homologation of Politics and Economics envisaged by
Constant. For Weber, the “freedom” of labor refers merely to the “specification” of its wants and needs not through
the market mechanism but rather
through “compromise” in Parliament of the necessarily conflicting individual
self-interests that are merely filtered
but never mechanically determined or reconciled by “commerce (!), by “the
market”, as was the pretension of Liberalism and the “science” of Political
Economy.
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