We must not fall for Beijing’s magical narrative
In 2014, President Xi
Jinping reached back into Chinese Communist Party folklore to reintroduce Mao
Zedong’s concept of magic weapons that could be used to achieve the great
rejuvenation of the country and achieve his “China Dream”. Xi was referring to
the co-optation tactics of the CCP’s United Front network to win friends,
influence governments and eliminate dissent inside China and in other
countries.
In recent years the CCP
has developed another magic weapon that complements its accumulation of
material power. This is the success Beijing is having in shaping grand
narratives in Australia and our region about China.
The genius is that these
narratives condition us to accept Chinese policies meekly even if they are
against our national interests.
The magic weapon is a
narrative buttressed by five basic messages: Chinese dominance is the
historical norm and is inevitable; the objectives of the CCP are permanent and
unchanging; a CCP-led China is fundamentally undeterrable; the party is
prepared to pay any price to achieve its core objectives; and the US is an
increasingly weak and unreliable ally.
If we accept these
propositions, the motivation for regional states to resist or counter even the
most coercive policies is greatly diminished even if we profoundly disagree
with China’s behaviour.
Striking an uneven
bargain becomes seemingly preferable to foolishly balancing against the future
inevitable dominant power.
Indeed, the message from
Beijing underlying the cascading threats against Australia is that we would do
better to make the best of this imminent Sino-centric future — as New Zealand
apparently is doing — than fight against it. To the extent that any cold hand
of friendship is offered, Australia and others ought to pocket the guaranteed
largesse that comes from submissively accepting Beijing’s conditions or risk
ending up with nothing.
The benefit of the
narrative for Beijing is that once we accept the five basic messages as a
given, then the only reasonable action is for others to compromise and alter
their objectives if they seek to maximise gains, avoid instability and
ultimately prevent war. The onus is then placed on the US and its allies such
as Australia and Japan to soften their policies or accept blame for all that is
troubling about China.
These narratives have
played out beautifully for Beijing in the South China Sea, where the US is
often cast as the provocateur when it is conducting freedom of navigation
operations, even those that serve to reaffirm the principles and rights of
international law and challenge Beijing’s militarisation of illegal land
features.
Or consider criticisms
that the Morrison government was foolish in taking the lead in calling for an
investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic or, more recently,
tearing up Victoria’s Belt and Road Initiative agreement under powers afforded
by the foreign relations act on the basis that the memorandum of understanding
ought to be allowed to lapse without controversy or fanfare.
On the merits of both
actions by Canberra, one could put forward compelling arguments. Calling for an
independent investigation into the deadliest and costliest non-kinetic disaster
in 100 years to ensure it does not happen again is hardly overreach.
Neither is cancelling an
agreement with Victoria that deliberately was used by the CCP to undermine the
federal government’s legitimate authority over our external policy and that was
used by Beijing to promote the BRI to other countries and provincial
governments.
As far as Beijing is
concerned, silence equals acquiescence. But many, having fallen for the magical
power of Beijing’s narrative, have normalised and internalised the CCP’s ill
intent and compulsion. It is this mindset that underpins criticisms that the
Morrison government is mismanaging the relationship with China.
What about war over the
future of Taiwan, something newly appointed Defence Minister Peter Dutton
raised as a possibility last weekend? Whether Australia is involved if that
terrible hypothetical comes to pass will depend on the circumstances and
reasons for why conflict occurs. But it is incorrect and self-defeating to
begin by assuming that Beijing cannot be deterred.
True, seizing Taiwan is a
genuine core objective for the CCP. It would be prepared to pay a heavy price
for meeting that objective.
But that is far removed
from Xi or the regime being prepared to pay any price. Just as the CCP has
based its strategy on identifying and acquiring the means to inflict
prohibitive military, economic and political costs on the US and its allies,
the latter countries are at the early stages of what it means to do the same to
Beijing.
Our collective failure to
think about and achieve that will loosen restraints on Beijing and increase the
incentive for Beijing to use force. For this reason, the better prospect for
peace is to pursue policies and acquire the means to persuade Beijing to
recalculate and alter its current trajectory.
China and the CCP have
weaknesses, vulnerabilities and dependencies that have been carefully and
cleverly concealed to perpetuate the preferred narrative. We and others are
engaged in a tense and fraught period of renegotiating the terms of our
relationship with China. Getting it right means dealing sensibly with reality
as it is, not as the CCP would have the rest of the world believe.
John Lee is an adjunct
professor and non-resident senior fellow at the US Studies Centre at the
University of Sydney and the Hudson Institute in Washington, DC. From 2016 to
2018 he was senior adviser to the Australian foreign minister.
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