The problem with the
late-romantic critique of capitalism is that it confuses its social relations
of production with the positivism of “science and technology”; and the problem
with the late-romantic critique of positivism is that it confuses it with
capitalism. The strategic political need of the bourgeoisie to identify social
relations with relations between things, or in other words to reify
social reality, is what is behind this pervasive and deleterious critical
deficiency because the rule of the bourgeoisie, like every rule, to the extent
that it is political, is also dependent on the violent control over material
production, and to the extent that it controls material production must also
depend on political legitimacy. The Marxian notion of “social relations of
production” is all here: it is meant to emphasize the political continuity
between the “social relations” (the political, social, cultural and religious
aspects) of the society of capital and the fact that capitalism is a specific
mode of political domination that relies almost exclusively on the exchange of
political freedom for material production, or in other words on the absurd
“exchange” of living activity with its “pro-ducts”, that is, with “dead
labour”. The difference between “the freedom of the ancients” and “the
liberties of the moderns” (Frederic Constant and John Locke, the founders of
liberalism) is that the former was based on the democratic participation of all
citizens to political decision-making in the State whereas the latter is based
on the protection on the part of a state apparatus (a civil and military
bureaucracy) of the “private rights” of citizens to their possessions: under
capitalism, “freedom” has been reduced to the legal claim over possessions – to
“liberty”, or to what we call “free-dom” or “greed-dom”. Bourgeois
late-romantics – whom Weber called disparagingly “literati” - pine for the “freedom” that their own political
violence has reduced to “greed-dom” by shifting the blame for this reduction to
an “impersonal” or “neutral” perpetrator, the positivism of “science and
technology” – absurdly transforming thereby a political reality into the very
“techno-scientific” reification that they seek to denounce!
Our aim in this piece is to
illustrate through an exposition of Schumpeter’s “methodological
individualism”, the real capitalist political strategy that constitutes its
ultimate foundation. The “science” intended by Schumpeter is that of the negatives Denken from Hobbes through
Schopenhauer and beyond. It is a
neo-Kantian, Berkeleyan-Machian or “idealist-empiricist” notion of science that
differs significantly from the Galilean-Newtonian science that preceded the
Industrial Revolution when the bourgeoisie was still consolidating its social
power and needed to justify its hegemony as the fruit of “labour”. The universe
of Galileo is a divine creation whose secret hidden laws are amenable to human discovery by virtue of the fact that
humans have been gifted with the divine powers of Reason. The task of Science
is therefore to discover in Nature the divine “rational laws” or “order” by
which Nature is bound through the faculty of Reason that the Divinity has
bestowed upon humans. Human beings do not “make” these laws, they exist
independently of humanity because they are of divine origin and yet they are
accessible to humans by virtue of the faculty that they share with the Divinity
– Reason. Science is therefore the application of human reason to the discovery
of the divine laws that govern it and Nature: consequently, science must be
subordinate to Reason, values must prevail over facts. This is an essentialist or objectivist science in the sense that the universe is governed by
laws independent of the human ability to discover them: in the
Galileo-Newtonian worldview, Nature and Reason, Object and Subject, are
separate yet interdependent entities.
Although human reason is able to
discover the laws by which Nature is governed, due to the faculty of free will
– liberum arbitrium – and its
“arbitrariness”, its “voluntariness”, and therefore the human ability to prefer
Evil over Good, human affairs could never be classified in accordance with the
same Ratio-Ordo, the same rational order, with which the Divinity had crafted
the universe. The “rationality” of the laws
governing nature – the rationality of science and the corresponding “rational
order” of Nature – could be established and proven only upon condition that the
rules of Reason themselves could be proven unconditionally or ab-solutely, that
is to say, according to a principle that was itself so certain as to be devoid
or independent of any rational proof. Yet such an intuitus originarius (Leibniz, Kant) is by definition not
accessible to human reason and must therefore exist without rational proof.
Already Adam Smith (in The History of
Astronomy) had attacked the Newtonian worldview on the grounds that Humean
scepticism showed how “metaphorical” – and therefore “conventional” - its
supposedly “universal laws of physics” were in reality: human reason, let alone
science, could not survive the application of its own principles to itself!
Both the Cartesian cogito – a
fallimentary attempt at syllogism – and the Kantian formalism of the
Categorical Imperative so cruelly derided by Nietzsche hinted at the coming
ex-haustion (or com-pletion, Heidegger’s Voll-endung)
of the summum bonum of Western
metaphysics – the identity of value and
fact, of the rational and the real.
First Machiavelli, then Hobbes and Vico established long before Nietzsche that
the “truth” of human reason was not “ab-solute” in any divine sense external to
human beings but was ab-solute and certain precisely to the degree that it
could be imposed “conventionally” or symbolically – that is to say, “by
definition” – by human beings themselves by virtue of their actions. Human
reason was “true” not in the sense that its truth was “universal” or
“ab-solute” (a legibus soluta), but
rather on the inverse principle that it was entirely “arbitrary”: it is the
very arbitrariness or conventionality of human principles that assures us of
their absolute certainty! Scientific truth becomes thereby the
ability of some human beings to assert their interests over other human beings
by force if necessary. (The devastating finality of what
we have called “Nietzsche’s Invariance” is all here – cf. our Nietzschebuch at scribd.com.)
Kant described his idealism as
“critical” because it traced the limits of
human knowledge set by the impenetrability of the thing-in-itself; and he
called it also “trans-scendental” because the validity of human reason can be
deduced only as a requisite of its formal consistency and not by its
identification with its Object (the famous Scholastic adaequatio rei et intellectus). But the very fact that the
thing-in-itself is unknowable decrees the absolute “futility” of both pure and
practical reason and of metaphysics altogether. Kant believed to have traced
the limits of human knowledge, but the effect of his philosophy was to
establish conclusively that no Object could delimit any longer the use of knowledge as the application of the power of the Subject.
This is the real reason why his idealism is “transcendental”. But if the
Subject no longer knows or admits of a non-Subject or Object, a natural order,
that can sub-ordinate the Subject by
the power of its over-arching rationality (Kant designated this with the
architectural term “contignatio”) –
the ab-solute primacy of the Ratio-Ordo -, the question then arises of how this
power of human action is to be governed and restrained inter homines, between Subjects. Herein lies the mortal danger of
solipsism: If “man is the measure of
all things”, what then is the measure
to be applied by some men to other men? As Nietzsche poignantly observes in the
Genealogie der Moral, man’s
experiments on nature are like nothing compared with those conducted by some
men on other men – for the simple reason that if “science” is the
rationalization of human domination over nature, then the ultimate abuse of
nature is that perpetrated by some men against other men who are also an
indivisible part of nature. Our central point here is that there is nothing at
all “rational” about this Rationalisierung
because it consists solely in the subordination of human living activity to an
abstract rule – logical and political – that can be given a quantifiable form.
The problem with the Vichian verum ipsum factum is that if truth is
to be found in human actions themselves,
then the end not only justifies and sanctions but also actually ascertains and
verifies the means and the means ascertain and verify the end: if truth is
certainty, then even the most diabolical violence can be true so long as its
outcomes are certain! Both Galileo and
in the physical sciences, as well as Machiavelli in political theory,
had taken care to distinguish the laws of nature from the laws governing human
affairs. After Hobbes, Vico and Kant, and finally with Mach, the two realms
become indistinguishable because certainty, not truth, is the object and limit – the objective - of science: hence, we have a politics of science and a
science of politics. The problem with positivism as the bourgeois philosophy par excellence is not so much that it
substitutes values with facts (cf. Koyre, From Closed World to Infinite Universe, and Husserl’s Crisis lecture) or that it con-fuses the
two (Kirchhoff): the real problem is that Positivism as a philosophy of science
means that the truth of human action is no longer “science” but certainty, that
is, the effectuality of domination
and violence.
The capitalist bourgeoisie was
the first historical agency to put this principle into political practice by
giving the name “science and technology” to its politically-enforceable and
politically certain objectives. The Italian philosophic critic
and historian Paolo Rossi is perhaps one of the few to have remarked upon the
crucial difference between the essentialism of the Classical and the
subjectivism of the Neo-Classical worldview:
"[For Vico i]the criterion of truth is not (as
the Cartesians wanted) neither in the immediate evidence nor in the clarity and
distinction of ideas but instead in the
conversion of the true with the fact....the
criterion of truth of a thing lies in doing it....[23] Mathematics and geometry are not, as Galileo had understood, revealing
the divine language present in nature, they do not say anything about the
world: they are a product of that singular ability that man had to reap useful
fruits from the constitutional limit of his mind....Vico now extends the criterion of verum-factum to
historical reality, enlarges it to understand that world that is the work and
construction of man," (Paul Rossi, Introduction to GB Vico, New Science,
pp.22-3).
Not certainty itself is the
problem, then; the problem is the object
of certainty – its political objective
- and the violence that the bourgeoisie must exert to demonstrate the certainty,
and therefore the factuality or “truth”, of its political objectives.
Schumpeter was entirely conscious of the “arbitrariness”
of the abstract rules (again,
intended in a logical and a political sense) that subtend bourgeois “economic
science”:
Pure static economics is nothing but an abstract
picture [or model] of certain
economic facts, i.e. a schema that should serve as a description about them. It
depends on certain
assumptions, and in this respect, it
is a creation of our
arbitrariness, just as every exact
science is. … [But] this does not prevent
theories from fitting facts.
(Schumpeter, 1908, 527; trans. by Shionoya, 1997,
103–4)
But the
“theory” that fits the facts relies on a reality, social and institutional,
that has been created and shaped by capitalist violence such that “the facts
fit the theory” – this is the incestuous facticity of bourgeois science whereby
theoria is subordinated to praxis. The schemata, the frame-work
of bourgeois science, then, does not simply “describe” reality, as Schumpeter
wrongly believes: rather, its axiological
essence serves the essential purpose of prescribing
the shape that reality must take if bourgeois rule is to prevail! The
“arbitrariness” to which Schumpeter refers is not the Scholastic liberum arbitrium or the humanist and
idealist “freedom of the will” or freedom “of choice”! In the Hobbesian
axiological and mechanical paradigm of the negatives
Denken, freedom is not contrary
to “reason” intended as calculative rationality, it is not “irrational” or
“unpredictable” or “indeterminate”: emphatically, it is not “freedom of choice”! As Weber argued, a “choice” is “free” when it is
“rational”, not when it is “irrational”, because an “irrational” choice must
have been conditioned by factors beyond the control of the decision-maker and
therefore it must be “un-free”. It is not “choice” that determines “freedom” but
“freedom” understood as “free-dom” that determines or conditions “choice”. In
other words, freedom becomes a function of coercion (by other human beings) now
seen as objective impersonal necessity! For Weber and
Schumpeter, as for the entirety of the negatives
Denken, free-dom is the ability to make rational decisions, not the ability
to choose rationally or irrationally. It follows inescapably therefore that
mechanical rationality is the true foundation and origin of “freedom”: and
mechanical rationality is possible only if it relates to “individuals” whose
irresoluble conflict with one another, the ineluctable clash of their
self-interests, “reduces” their freedom
to free-dom and their conduct to that
of the “inert bodies” of mechanical physics by making their living activity quantifiable through sheer political
violence!
Political
“freedom” is conceivable in this schema only as the “free-dom” of
self-interested individuals. And the ultima
ratio of human conduct must be the preservation of one’s life in a world in
which individuals in the state of nature will destroy humanity itself because
of their unbridled cupidity. The Rationalisierung
as intended by the negatives Denken
therefore is the exact opposite of humanistic freedom because it is instead the
expression of free-dom intended as
“the clash of wills” of atomistic selfish individuals - as “dis-enchantment” (Ent-zauberung),
as the relinquishment of any and every illusion about the freedom of the human will, the abandonment of any sentimentality
about the inviolability and invincibility of the human spirit as a universal
goal! (The inability to grasp this crucial point is perhaps the biggest lapse
in Karl Lowith’s interpretation of Weber’s work in Max Weber and Karl Marx. Specifically, Lowith confuses Weberian
dis-enchantment and Marxian alienation in that the former concept is
ineluctable whereas the latter contains its own dissolution or supersession.)
The market
mechanism described by the axioms of neoclassical equilibrium theory and
marginal utility that only apparently
does away with ethico-political considerations in favour of the “productive
efficiency” of its paradigm, by eliminating Objective Value, the subject-matter of economic theory, can
artificially and arbitrarily limit
and confine the ambit, the sphere, of economic science away from its metabolic aspects. The daft excuse
opined by Joan Robinson that “a one-to-one map of reality is useless” again
marginalizes the reality of production as metabolic interaction and reduces the
problem of the ethico-political effectuality of theory to one of “neutral
scientific usefulness”, of “universal human instrumentality”. But the very
essence of an instrument or a tool rests on the human agency in whose hands it is held! Whereas in
the case of market process it is the facts themselves that impose the theory of
market process as the ec-sistence of
equilibrium, as its extrinsication, unfolding and implementation; in the case
of equilibrium, from the perspective of
equilibrium analysis, it is the theory itself, its schema, that selects and
frames the facts and fits them to
a particular Vision or Frame-work of
social reality. Schumpeter always conceded the “arbitrariness” of this process:
The whole of pure
economics rests with Walras on the two
conditions that every
economic unit wants to maximize utility and
that demand for every good
equals supply. All his theorems follow
from· these two
assumptions. Edgeworth, Barone, and others may
have supplemented his
work; Pareto and others may have gone
beyond it in individual
points: the significance of his work is not
thereby touched. Whoever
knows the origin and the workings of
the exact natural sciences
knows also that their great achievements
are, in method and
essence, of the same kind as Walras'. To find
exact forms for the
phenomena whose interdependence is given us
by experience, to reduce
these forms to, and derive them from, each
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